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Abstract
In the continuing discussion on migration and development, the vulnerability of all migrant
groups to exploitation and mistreatment in host countries has been highlighted along with an
emphasis on protecting their rights. However, xenophobia has not yet received explicit attention
although anti-migrant sentiments and practices are clearly on the rise even in receiving countries
in developing regions. Despite gaps in existing empirical work, research and anecdotal evidence
exposes pervasive forms of discrimination, hostility, and violence experienced by migrant
communities, with the latter becoming easy scapegoats for various social problems in host
countries. This study attempts to insert xenophobia in this debate on migration and development
by examining the growth of this phenomenon in host countries in the South. It provides short
accounts of xenophobia witnessed in recent times in five countries including South Africa, India,
Malaysia, Libya, and Thailand. The ambiguity surrounding the concept is discussed and crucial
features that define xenophobia are outlined. A variety of methods to study it are likewise
identified. Using a wide range of examples from diverse contexts, the paper explores possible
reasons for the intensification of xenophobia. The final sections of the paper briefly outline the
developmental consequences of rampant xenophobia for migrant and host populations while
examining policy options to tackle it.
Keywords: Xenophobia; anti-immigrant prejudice; violence; intolerance; social exclusion;
discrimination; migrant vulnerability; policy; South Africa, India, Libya, Thailand, Malaysia.

The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quickdisseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that
presented in Human Development Reports.

INTRODUCTION

According to the IOM, the number of international migrants very likely reached
200 million in 2008, more than double the figure in 1965.1 As the number of migrants
continues to grow, the character of international migration has been transformed, with
many sending countries now becoming receivers and transit points for international
migrants. This holds true especially for numerous developing countries that have become
destinations for migrants from other developing and low-income countries. South-South
migration, as it is now commonly referred to, is acquiring ever-greater significance in
contemporary migration configurations. This is confirmed in a current World Bank report
that suggests a shift from North-South to South-South migration with several developing
countries like India, Côte d‘Ivoire, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan now
appearing in the list of top receivers worldwide.2

In 2005, there were an estimated 78 million migrants residing in developing
countries of the South. In terms of the global stock of migrants, two out of every five
migrants were residents of countries in the South.3 The World Bank estimates that
international migration between countries in the South may now be almost as high as
North-South migrations.4 The share may be even higher if irregular and informal flows,
which are an important feature of South-South migrations, are taken into consideration.5
Weak and unreliable databases on bilateral flows (especially between countries that share
contiguous borders and within regions) and the informal, and to some extent circular,
1

IOM 2008 World Migration 2008: Managing Labor Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy,
International Organization of Migration: Geneva
2
World Bank 2009 World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography, World Bank:
Washington DC, pp. 150-151
3
It must be acknowledged that different databases provide somewhat varying figures for international
migration. As per the revised estimates for 2005 World Migrant Stock calculated by the United Nations
Population Division, there were some 75 million and 114 million migrants in more and less developed
regions respectively. See Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the
United Nations Secretariat 2006 ‗Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision‘, (Internet source:
http://esa.un.org/migration, Last accessed 13 February 2009)
4
Ratha, Dilip and William Shaw 2007 South-South Migration and Remittances, Working Paper No. 102,
World Bank: Washington DC
5
Ratha, Dilip and William Shaw 2007 ‗South-South migration and remittances‘, Migration Information
Source, September 4, www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/print.cfm?ID=641 (Last accessed December
2008)
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nature of South-South migrations also make assessment difficult and incomplete.6 All the
same, there are strong indications that flows between countries, and within regions, of the
South, are a noteworthy aspect of the contemporary global migration system. Ninety
percent of the flows into India, for instance, are from neighbouring countries. Other
countries like Côte d‘Ivoire and Hong Kong receive 80 percent of migrants from in the
region. Pakistan receives the largest number of migrants from nearby Bangladesh. In
Sub-Saharan Africa, more than 60 percent of migrants move to other countries within the
region.7 Similarly in South Asia, more than half of the migrants move to neighbouring
countries or to other developing countries.8

Over the past two decades migration to Western and Eastern Europe has been
accompanied by growing resentment of immigrants and refugees. The nature, causes and
consequences of anti-immigrant and refugee sentiment and actions have been extensively
documented. While anti-migrant sentiment continues to be strongly entrenched in the
West, it is increasingly evident in developing countries as well. The present-day surge in
intolerance and xenophobia in developing countries has been inadequately studied and
documented. However, information from advocacy groups and anecdotal evidence
presents a grim scenario. Ironically, developing countries whose citizens experienced and
continue to face poor treatment in traditional-immigration countries in the West are now
witnessing and often legitimizing the exploitation of migrants from other poor countries.

As in the West, resentment of migrants and xenophobic action in the global South
is not a new phenomenon. The expulsion of 800,000 Ghanaians from Nigeria in the
1980s, for example, was a clear early example of a people and government who had
become increasingly inhospitable towards migrants from another African country.
However, intolerance does appear to have become more widespread and intense as
South-South migration has increased.
6

Parsons, Christopher et al 2007 ‗Quantifying international migration: a database of bilateral migrant
stocks‘ in Ozden, Caglar and Maurice Schiff (eds) International Migration, Economic Development and
Policy, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17-58; See also Ratha and Shaw
2007
7
World Bank 2009 World Development Report 2009, p. 151-52
8
Ibid
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The contemporary resurgence of intolerance and xenophobia presents a
formidable challenge to policy-makers and states. There can be no doubt that xenophobia
destabilizes and seriously undermines the potentially beneficial relationship between
international migration and human development. It acts as one of the major obstacles to
maximizing the economic and social benefits of international migration, affecting both
migrant and host populations adversely in many different ways. Escalated levels of
xenophobia towards migrants and refugees directly contribute to the vulnerability and
exploitation of these groups leading to marked inequalities in the long-term between
migrant and non-migrant populations. In a broader sense, xenophobia undermines
principles of human equality, social justice, and social cohesion.

Recent international forums on migration and development have consistently
highlighted the need to tackle xenophobia and the related political, economic, and social
exclusion of migrants, immigrants, and refugees. On July 7-11, 2007, participants at the
first meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in Belgium
underscored the urgency of developing new initiatives to counter xenophobia and racism
as well as the marginalization, abuse and discrimination faced by migrant groups.9 The
forum further emphasized the need for action to protect the fundamental rights of
migrants. The second meeting of the GFMD in Manila at the end of October 2008
renewed this message in its adopted slogan: ‗protecting and empowering migrants for
development.‘ In 2004, the United Nations Commission for Social Development had
earlier strongly identified the ‗exploitation, discrimination, xenophobia and racism
towards immigrants [as] scourges‘.10 The High-Level Dialogue on International
Migration and Development at the UN General Assembly on 14-15 September 2006
urged receiving countries to protect migrants against discrimination, racism and
xenophobia by introducing effective measures to counter migrant abuse.

9

GFMD 2007 Report on the First Meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, Brussels,
July 9-11
10
United Nations Commission for Social Development 2004 ‗Chairman‘s summary of panel discussion on
‗international migration and migrants from a social perspective‘‘, United Nations Commission for Social
Development, Forty-second session, 4-13 February
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In 2005, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)
recommended the strengthening of legal and normative frameworks that would allow
migrant groups to exercise their fundamental human rights.11 The Commission also urged
local authorities, migrant groups and other non-state actors to promote social cohesion
and the integration of immigrants. Nevertheless, as the 2008 UN ESCAP Economic and
Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific pointed out, despite the growth in international
migration, migrant rights remain at the ‗fringes of discussion.‘12 The protection of
migrant rights continues to be a key point in recent debates on migration and
development although xenophobia per se has not received detailed attention.

How does xenophobia influence the relationship between international migration
and human development? In this paper, we examine these connections with an emphasis
on South-South migration. The paper has been divided into five sections. The first section
provides a working definition of xenophobia and summarizes the methods by which it
can be measured and assessed. The second section reviews various approaches to
explaining the phenomenon of xenophobia. Examples from a variety of developing and
developed country contexts are provided to illustrate these approaches. The third section
provides some case studies of developing countries from different parts of the world that
have experienced egreguious xenophobic violence or violations of the basic rights of
migrants and refugees in recent years. The last two sections of this paper examine the
consequences of xenophobia for host and migrant populations as well as policy responses
to xenophobia.

DEFINING AND MEASURING XENOPHOBIA

Despite its widespread usage, xenophobia remains an ambiguous term. It is
derived from the Greek words ‗xenos‘ and ‗phobos‘ which correspondingly mean
‗strange or foreign‘ and ‗phobia.‘ In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, xenophobia is
11

GCIM 2005 Migration in an Inter-Connected World: New Directions for Action (Report of the Global
Commission on International Migration), GCIM: Geneva
12
UN ESCAP 2008 Sustaining Growth and Sharing Prosperity: Asia and Pacific Economic and Social
Survey 2008, UNESCAP: Bangkok
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defined as a ‗morbid dislike of foreigners.‘ Scholars have conceptualized xenophobia in a
number of ways. Berezin defines xenophobia as the ‗fear of difference embodied in
persons or groups.‘13 For Nyamnjoh, xenophobia is the ‗intense dislike, hatred or fear of
Others.‘14 It has been characterized as ‗an attitudinal orientation of hostility against nonnatives in a given population.‘15 And, it has been seen as ‗hostility towards strangers and
all that is foreign.‘16 Another definition views xenophobia as ‗attitudes, prejudices, and
behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons based on the perception that they
are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity.‘17

In some explanations, this prejudice extends towards non-citizens and other
marginal groups. It can also be directed toward other ethnic minorities, including third or
fourth generation descendants of immigrants. Another point of confusion is that
xenophobia has been closely tied to racism and persists in newer characterizations of
racism. Described as ‗new racism,‘ ‗differential racism,‘ or ‗cultural racism,‘ cultural
rather than racial differences become the basis of exclusion in newer forms.18 For others,
xenophobia, unlike racism and nationalism, is a spontaneous, ‗natural‘ biological reaction
to strangers. Defined in such terms, xenophobia becomes a ubiquitous phenomenon
which is difficult to challenge or confront. A variety of other terms to describe
xenophobia have been developed including ‗nativism,‘ ethnocentrism, ‗xeno-racism,‘19

13

Berezin, Mabel 2006 ‗Xenophobia and the new nationalisms‘ in Gerard Delanty and Krishna Kumar
(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, Sage: London, p. 273
14
Nyamnjoh, Francis 2006 Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern
Africa, CODESRIA and Zed Books: Dakar, London and New York, p. 5.
15
ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001 ‗International migration, racism, discrimination and xenophobia‘, Paper for
the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
(WCAR), August
16
Stolcke, Verena 1999 ‗New rhetorics of exclusion in Europe‘, International Social Science Journal, 51
(159), p. 28
17
ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001 ‗International migration, racism, discrimination and xenophobia‘
18
Delanty, Gerard and Peter Millward 2007 ‗Post-liberal anxieties and discourse of peoplehood in Europe:
nationalism, xenophobia and racism‘ in Mole, Richard C M (ed.) Discursive Constructions of Identity in
European Politics, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndsmill, pp. 137-48; See also Kundnani, Arun 2001 ‗In a
foreign land: the new popular racism‘, Race & Class, 43 (2), pp. 41-60
19
Fekete, Liz 2001 ‗The emergence of xeno-racism‘, Race & Class, 43 (2), pp. 23-40
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‗ethno-exclusionism,‘20 ‗anti-immigrant prejudice,‘21 ‗the immigrant threat‘22 and
‗immigration-phobia.‘23

In this report, xenophobia is associated with the following:

Xenophobia consists of highly negative perceptions and practices that
discriminate against non-citizen groups on the basis of their foreign origin or
nationality. It affects all categories of migrants, immigrants, refugees, and
asylum-seekers. Different migrant groups may, however, experience xenophobia
to varying degrees depending on their cultural, racial and ethnic make-up, class
composition, and migrant status.
Xenophobia is perpetuated through a dynamic public rhetoric that actively
stigmatizes and vilifies some or all migrant groups by playing up the ‗threat‘
posed by their presence and making them scapegoats for social problems.
Xenophobia is not simply an attitudinal orientation. Hostile and skewed
perceptions of migrant groups generally go hand in hand with discriminatory
practices and poor treatment of such groups. Acts of violence, aggression and
brutality towards migrant groups represent extreme and escalated forms of
xenophobia.
Xenophobia is not a ‗natural‘ response by native populations to the presence of
foreigners. Like racism and nationalism, it is a social and political phenomenon
that contributes to the marginalization and/or exclusion of migrant groups in
social and national settings.
Xenophobia is crucially linked to nation-building and nationalism, in particular,
its aggressive forms.

20

See Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers 2003 Overview of Theories, Hypotheses and
Results on Attitudes of Majorities Towards Minorities (Report 1 of ‗Majorities‘ Attitudes towards
Minorities‘), EUMC: Vienna
21
Mclaren, Lauren M 2003 ‗Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe‘
22
Lucassen, Leo 2005 The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe
Since 1850, University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago
23
Alexseev, Mikhael 2006 Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe and the United
States, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York
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Other processes of segregation like racism and exclusionary nationalism can
often shape xenophobia in distinctive ways, which contributes in part to its
resilience.
The mixed outcomes of immigration for host populations make xenophobia an
exceptionally difficult and sensitive topic.

INTOLERANCE AND XENOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL NORTH

The World Values Survey 2005 found that nearly 40 percent of participants from
nineteen European countries approved of strict limits on immigration while 42.5 percent
only supported the entry of immigrants as long as employment was available. Nearly 9
percent of the respondents endorsed a total ban on immigration. In some countries many
participants indicated that they would not assist immigrants; they included the Ukraine
(66 percent), the Russian Federation (55 percent) and the United Kingdom (41 percent).
In others like the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and France, 14.2 percent, 13.1
percent and 10.4 percent of respondents respectively supported zero levels of
immigration.

Longitudinal data from the 1997, 2000, and 2003 Eurobarometer surveys showed
that 60 percent of respondents believed that the limits to a multi-cultural society had been
reached, effectively opposing further acceptance of immigrants into their countries.24
Nearly 40 percent of participants opposed civil rights for legal migrants and 22 percent of
EU respondents endorsed the repatriation of legal immigrants, above all, the unemployed.
A Special Eurobarometer study conducted in 2003 by the European Opinion Research
Group in 15 EU countries including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain,
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom displayed comparable results.25

More than half of the

respondents (52 percent) disagreed with the statement ‗immigrants contribute a lot to our
24

Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers 2003 Majorities’ Attitudes Towards Minorities in
European Member States: Results from the Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-2003 (Report 2), EUMC:
Vienna
25
European Opinion Research Group 2004 Special Eurobarometer: Citizenship and Sense of Belonging,
European Commission: Brussels
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economy.‘26 This negative view was most strongly expressed in Belgium where 66
percent of the population disagreed with the statement.

Results of the European Social Survey (2002-2003) for Western and Eastern
Europe offer added robust evidence of ethnic exclusionism, a negative stance that
opposes both immigration and diversity.27 Fifty-eight percent of Europeans perceived
immigrants as a collective threat to economic well-being and cultural identity and one in
two Europeans displayed open resistance to immigrants. Nearly half of the people living
in European societies opposed diversity, indicating that they would prefer a monocultural society where a majority of the population shared the same culture. Twenty
percent of the population wanted to avoid all social interaction with immigrants and
ethnic minorities residing in their countries. Again, these tendencies were more
pronounced in selected countries. For example, in Greece and Hungary, resistance to
immigrants was much higher than that recorded in other European countries. The
resistance to asylum-seekers was higher in countries like the UK, the Netherlands,
Belgium and some eastern European countries like Hungary, Slovenia and the former
East Germany.

Public opinion surveys have shown that many EU citizens hold biased and
stereotypical views about immigrants and refugees, especially those from non-Western
countries. According to the 2000 Eurobarometer Survey, 52 percent of participants
believed that minority groups, including immigrants, have a negative impact on the
quality of education in their country. Fifty-eight percent of participants from ten
European countries (namely, Greece, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Austria, Luxemburg, Denmark, Italy and Finland) linked migrants with rising
levels of crime. These tendencies were even more marked in individual EU countries. In
Greece, an overwhelming 85 percent of respondents in the 2000 Eurobarometer Survey
accepted that immigrants ‗steal jobs‘ from citizens. In Finland, over a third of those
26

Ibid, p. 27
Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers 2004 Majorities Attitudes Towards Minorities in
Western and Eastern European Societies: Results from the European Social Survey 2002-2003 (Report 4),
EUMC: Vienna
27
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polled agreed that minority groups exacerbate unemployment rates. Similarly, 81 percent
of Greeks felt that migrants were more prone to criminal activities compared to nonmigrants. In Ireland, which had the lowest figure for the EU, some 30 percent of
participants blamed migrants for increasing crime. Likewise, the Special Eurobarometer
study of 2003 showed that 42 percent of respondents deemed ‗immigrants to be a threat
to their way of life.‘28 In countries like Greece, the UK and Belgium, 69 percent, 54
percent and 53 percent respectively agreed with this statement.

These negative attitudes translate into systematic discrimination against migrants
in their daily lives. A study conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and
Xenophobia (EUMC) between 2002 and 2005 based on research in individual countries
like Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and the UK supports this observation.29 Some 30 percent
of participants had faced unfair treatment in employment and 25 percent in education
while 25 percent had encountered unfair treatment from the police in these countries. The
results were more skewed for individual countries like Greece, Belgium and Portugal
where 46 percent, 37 percent, and 32 percent of respondents had experience of being
treated in a discriminatory manner while seeking employment. Certain groups of
migrants felt that they were particularly discriminated against in such countries. In
Belgium, 56 percent of participants of Chinese origin, 29 percent of Congolese origin, 28
percent of Turkish origin and 26 percent of Moroccan origin, felt that they were subjected
to discrimination because of their ‗foreign background.‘30 In Greece, migrants from the
Soviet Union, Romania and Albania felt the most discriminated against, while in France
and Ireland, African migrants recorded the highest levels of discrimination. Perhaps the
most disturbing finding of this study is the extreme reluctance of migrants to report such
acts to authorities, with a staggering 86 percent of those who experienced discrimination
failing to do so.

28

European Opinion Research Group 2004 Special Eurobarometer: Citizenship and Sense of Belonging, p.
28
29
EUMC/FRA 2006 Migrants’ Experiences of Racism and Xenophobia in 12 EU Member States – Pilot
Study, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia: Vienna
30
Ibid, p. 8
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A 2002 UNHCR survey in Moscow revealed that an overwhelming 58 percent of
Afghan asylum-seekers had been targeted in brutal attacks requiring hospitalization for
an average of 22 days.31 Nearly 80 percent had been attacked with crude weapons like
metal chains, gas cylinders, bats and beer bottles.32 The frequency of xenophobic
violence was even higher for African refugees, 77 percent of whom reported being
attacked in the previous month.33 Another UNHCR news report suggests that violence
against African asylum-seekers has become such a routine occurrence in Moscow that
many of them have opted for third-country resettlement.34 A more recent assessment by
the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights contends that the level of xenophobic violence in
2007 rose by almost a third compared to the previous year with the number of fatalities
rising by 20 percent.35 The number of victims increased by nearly two times the figure
recorded for 2006.

Numerous studies have documented the escalation in public violence against
ethnic minorities in Western Europe during the previous decade. Some of the most highprofile incidents included arson attacks on residences occupied by asylum-seekers and
immigrants in places like Lubeck, Hoyerswerda, Rostock and Molln.36 In spite of that,
aggression directed at ethnic minorities persists almost a decade later. In fact, between
2000 and 2006, as the 2008 Hate Crime Survey notes, eight European Union countries
experienced an upward trend in recorded racist and xenophobic crimes, including
Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Slovakia, Finland and the United Kingdom.37 This
evidence is alarming especially since many of these countries have long histories of
racism, xenophobia and discrimination against ethnic minorities. These are also some of
the countries that, in recent decades, have implemented the strongest anti-discrimination
measures to counter xenophobia and racism.
31

Colville, Rupert 2006 ‗The perfect scapegoat‘, Refugees Magazine, 142 (1), pp. 5-8
Ibid
33
Ibid
34
UNHCR News Stories 2003 ‗Reaching out to asylum-seekers in Russia‘, 30 May
35
Moscow Bureau of Human Rights 2007 ‗Brief review of aggressive xenophobic manifestations on the
territory of Russian Federation in 2007‘, http://antirasizm.ru/english.php (Last accessed February 2007)
36
Fekete, Liz 2000 ‗How the German press stoked the Lubeck fires‘, Race & Class, 41 (4), pp. 19-41; See
also Bindman, Geoffrey 1997 ‗Murder in Lubeck‘ Race & Class 39 (1), pp. 95-100
37
Human Rights First 2008 Violence Based on Racism and Xenophobia: 2008 Hate Crime Survey, Human
Rights First: Washington DC
32
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INTOLERANCE AND XENOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Public opinion surveys of citizen attitudes to migrants and refugees are much less
common in the Global South. Xenophobic sentiment usually has to be inferred from the
public statements of officials, the media and attacks on migrants. South Africa was
rocked in May 2008 by horrific, large-scale attacks on migrants, especially African
migrants from Southern Africa.38 This episode marked the latest development in a long
series of violent incidents victimizing migrants and refugees in that country.39 But it was
also the expression of deep-seated and pervasive anti-foreign attitudes amongst the
country‘s citizenry at large.

In Southern Africa, systematic public opinion surveys have been conducted and
provide reliable and representative data about citizen attitudes to migrants and refugees.
In 2001 and 2002, the Southern African Migration Project‘s

(SAMP) National

Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) on citizens‘ attitudes toward immigration in Southern
Africa showed that xenophobia was rampant among diverse groups and communities in
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana.40 Anti-migrant sentiments cut across class,
employment status, race, and gender lines. In the Botswana NIPS, more than 20 percent
of respondents supported policies that would expel all immigrants from the country,
irrespective of their legal status.41 The outcome of questions on citizens‘ willingness to
participate in action against immigrants from Southern Africa as a whole was even more
disquieting. Nearly half of those interviewed (47 percent) were ready to participate in
action to inhibit migrants from settling into their neighbourhoods. Some 46 percent were
willing to act to thwart them from opening businesses in their localities. More than one
third of respondents (39 percent) were agreeable to be involved in practices that would

38

Crush, Jonathan et al 2008 The perfect storm: the realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa,
SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 50, SAMP: Kingston and Cape Town
39
Crush, Jonathan 2000 ‗The dark side of democracy: migration, xenophobia and human rights in South
Africa‘, International Migration, 38 (6), pp. 103-20
40
Crush, Jonathan and Wade Pendleton 2004 ‗Regionalizing xenophobia? Citizen attitudes to immigration
and refugee policy in Southern Africa‘, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 30, SAMP: Kingston and Cape
Town
41
Campbell, Eugene and John O Oucho 2003 Changing Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in
Botswana, Migration Policy Series No. 28, SAMP: Kingston and Cape Town
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prevent migrants from becoming their co-workers. A similar share (38 percent) was
willing to prevent children from immigrant families from studying in the same schools as
their offspring. Botswana was once hailed as a ‗country of immigration‘ for importing,
for several decades, many skilled immigrants from various countries in Africa, Asia and
the West.42

Even developing countries like Thailand and Tanzania, that had enjoyed a good
reputation for welcoming migrants and refugees, have recently imposed stringent
restrictions on their entry and residence or randomly expelled migrants and refugees. In
2004, the ruling party of Tanzania openly declared: ‗we are tired of refugees.‘ 43 Even
some of the poorest countries not generally associated with immigration have displayed
excessive brutality towards vulnerable migrants and refugees. For example, Angolan
soldiers raped, tortured, and thrashed irregular Congolese migrants in December 2007
before deporting them.44 Employed in diamond mines, many victims indicated that they
were subjected to cavity searches and detained for extended periods without food or
water.45

Elsewhere, local residents have violently attacked migrants and refugees on
several occasions. In December 2005, the Dominican National Committee for Migration
voiced concern over frequent episodes of xenophobic violence targeting poor Haitian
migrants.46 There have been numerous cases of public lynching of Haitian migrants in the
past few years in the Dominican Republic. In July and August 2005, locals set fire to
shacks occupied by Haitian migrants and killed six migrants in the capital Santo
Domingo. Migrant-bashing campaigns have also been witnessed in India where a student
group Chiring Chapori Yuva Manch (CCYM) sent out text messages en masse in the
42

Morapedi, Wazha 2007 ‗Post-liberation xenophobia in southern Africa: the case of the influx of
undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants into Botswana, c. 1995-2004‘, Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, 25 (2), pp. 229-50
43
Mckinsey, Kitty 2006 ‗‗Tired of refugees‘: Is African tolerance in decline?‘, Refugees Magazine, 142 (1),
pp. 23-24
44
Simao, Paul 2007 ‗Angolan soldiers rape, beat Congolese migrants – group‘, Reuters Alertnet, 6
December, http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/Lo6594708.htm (Last accessed January 2009)
45
Ibid
46
Harman, Danna 2006 ‗Haitian migrants face rising backlash next door‘, Christian Science Monitor, 24
January, http://csmonitor.com/2006/0124/p04s01-woam.htm (Last accessed January 2009)

12

north-western province of Assam in mid-2005 urging citizens to ‗save nation, save
identity. Let‘s take an oath – no food, no job, no shelter to [migrant] Bangladeshis‘.47
Like in Western countries, migrants have been subjected repeatedly to demeaning and
degrading treatment by citizens of host countries in the South. A Ghanaian migrant living
in Libya described it in the following words: ‗We are worse than dogs to the Libyans. If
we were slaves, they would have treated us better‘.48

In this section, we present case studies of five countries in the South that have
experienced episodes of xenophobic violence as well as acute discrimination against
migrants, immigrants, and refugees. This is not to suggest that xenophobic violence does
not occur elsewhere in the South or that it is everywhere this intense. However, this
report profiles five countries from different parts of the world to illustrate that this is a
global problem which, in the absence of national and international action, is only likely to
worsen.

South Africa
The explosion of xenophobic violence in South Africa‘s poorer urban
communities in May 2008 led to over 60 deaths (including several by the grotesque
‗necklacing‘ method of burning people alive), numerous assaults and injuries and
widespread damage to property owned by foreign nationals.49 Tens of thousands fled
their homes into makeshift ‗refugee‘ encampments. By the end of 2008, the government
had closed all of the camps, insisting either that the residents (who included many
destitute women and children) should either ‗reintegrate‘ or return home. Many were
already asylum-seekers or refugees so return home was hardly an option.50 The other
choice offered by government put them at risk of further attacks and appraisals and,

47

Ramachandran, Sujata 2005 ‗Indifference, impotence, intolerance: transnational Bangladeshis in India‘,
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indeed, sporadic attacks still continue.51 The most recent of these was in January 2009
when an armed mob led by a community councillor entered a building in Durban and
began attacking foreign citizens. Two men, a Tanzainian and a Zimbabwean, jumped or
were pushed to their deaths from an upper floor, leading to the arrest for murder of the
councillor and several mob-members.52

The startled response of many in government and the media to May 2005
suggested that they were unaware that anti-foreign intolerance and xenophobia had
become a major challenge to human rights in a democratic South Africa and to the values
inscribed in the post-apartheid constitution. As long ago as 1995, however, the Southern
African Bishops‘ Conference noted that ‗there is no doubt that there is a very high level
of xenophobia in our country.‘ Their venerable conclusion was supported by successive
public opinion surveys that demonstrated that South African sentiment towards foreign
nationals was amongst the most hostile in the world.53 Analyses of official
pronouncements and media coverage of migration issues showed that xenophobia
extended well beyond isolated individual attitudes.54 It was pervasive, deep-rooted and
structural, cutting across all divides. If there was one thing that united this diverse
population, it was their dislike for foreign migrants in the country.

A brief effort by the South African Human Rights Commission to address the issue
between 1999 and 2002, in the form of a ‗Roll Back Xenophobia‘ campaign, did not
achieve a great deal before it was wound up. The campaign held educational workshops
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for journalists or editors who proved to be extremely hostile to any suggestion that their
‗facts-based‘ reporting smacked of xenophobia.

Between 2002 and 2008 attitudes continued to harden. In 2006, for example,
SAMP found that 37 percent of a nationally representative sample wanted a total ban on
foreigners entering the country. Three quarters supported electrification of borders and
72 percent agreed that non-citizens should carry personal identification with them at all
times. Sixty percent supported a policy of deporting any non-citizen with HIV/AIDS.
Only a minority thought that migrants and refugees should enjoy basic rights such as
freedom of movement, legal protection, police protection and access to social services.
As many as 30 percent said they would take action to prevent migrants from
neighbouring countries moving into or operating a business in their community. And 16
percent of those interviewed said they were prepared to combine with others to force
foreign nationals to leave their area.55 And indeed, in the years and months leading up to
May 2008, violent attacks on foreign nationals became increasingly more common.

Despite the overwhelming research evidence of a powder-keg of xenophobic
sentiment, the issue was largely ignored in public political discourse, until it was too late.
Even then, the response of those in government to May 2008 was largely denialist in
character.

Several prominent politicians initially voiced surprise and concern and

acknowledged that xenophobia was a significant problem.56 They were quickly silenced
by an official ‗party line‘ from the President‘s office. The attacks were criminal, not
xenophobically motivated, said President Mbeki at an official day of mourning for the
victims.57 South Africans were not xenophobic and anyone who said so was themselves
being xenophobic. The violence was, to put it mildly, a massive embarrassment for a
President and government who were active proponents of regional solidarity and PanAfricanism and are preparing to host the 2010 Football World Cup. Better, the President
must have reasoned, to present the violence as the work of fringe criminal elements rather
55
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than in any way representative of South Africa attitudes to foreign migrants and citizens
in general.

The problem of course was that denialism ignored the overwhelming

evidence of deep and longstanding xenophobia in the country.

Explanations for the violence of May 2008 quickly focused on the material
conditions in affected communities. Many journalists and most academics blamed the
events on the ANC government‘s poor service delivery record since 1994.58 In these
accounts, the failures of the government to deal with endemic poverty, joblessness, lack
of shelter and basic services had led to the scapegoating of foreign migrants by frustrated
citizens. The government‘s ‗failure‘ to control its borders was seen as another
precipitating factor by some commentators.59 South Africans certainly believe that their
country is being ‗flooded‘ by millions of irregular migrants from the rest of Africa
despite evidence to the contrary.60 The numbers of foreign migrants in South Africa at
any one time is certainly a matter of dispute yet it is highly unlikely that there are 3-4
million Zimbabweans in South Africa (as claimed by Mbeki) or 8-10 million
undocumented migrants (as claimed by Home Affairs officials).

Research (including regular national surveys) shows that xenophobia (expressed
as hostility to the very presence of non-nationals and attributing to them a range of
stereotypical negative characteristics) has been widespread in South Africa since at least
1994. The media has played a significant role in perpetuating negative stereotypes, as
has official and popular discourse.

Anti-foreign invective and verbal abuse is

depressingly common on South African streets. But most people‘s negative attitudes are
not the result of first-hand contact with migrants. In 2006 for example, 61 percent of
South Africans said they had ‗little or no‘ personal contact with migrants from
neighbouring countries.61
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While there is an understandable reductionist tendency to view anti-foreign
violence as a direct product of the material deprivation and competition amongst poor
South Africans, this does not explain why all poor communities did not explode in May
2008. Certainly the violence was stoked by organized groups in affected communities
and there is evidence of inter-community collaboration. But the truth is that the violence
could, and very well may in the future, be much more widespread. In almost every case,
attacks were accompanied by the most blunt and bellicose hate speech. The attacks were
a brutal example of national ‗ethnic cleansing,‘ of removing foreign citizens from
territory deemed to ‗belong‘ to citizens only. In the political failing to acknowledge the
reality that xenophobic attitudes are longstanding and pervasive (and had hardened in
recent years), and by attributing May 2008 to criminal fringe elements, xenophobia was
regrettably swept under the carpet once again. A day of ‗Social Dialogue‘ initiated by the
Home Affairs Minister in September 2008 showed that there were some in government
who were not happy with this xeno-denialism. But whether this will lead to the kind of
state-initiated national effort to roll-back xenophobia in schools, workplaces,
communities and on the streets remains to be seen.

India

Rising xenophobic antagonism in India has been directed almost exclusively at
irregular migrants from neighbouring Bangladesh, who are increasingly viewed as a
threat to national well-being and security. In April 2008, a report by the Parliamentary
Standing Committee on Home Affairs declared that ‗a large presence of illegal
Bangladeshi immigrants poses a grave threat to the internal security [of India] and it
should be viewed strongly.‘62 Citing media reports on Bangladeshi insurgent groups‘
involvement in recent terrorist acts in India, the 25-member committee recommended that
the movement of Bangladeshi migrants into the country should be ‗strictly monitored.‘63
The conclusion of the committee was not unexpected, especially since it was headed by
62
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Sushma Swaraj from the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP and its cohort
of far right Hindu nationalist parties have, since the early 1990s, vigorously advocated
the large-scale expulsion of irregular, largely Muslim, migrants from Bangladesh.64 Even
so, the observations of the Parliamentary Standing Committee reflect the general mood in
India which has become increasingly belligerent and intolerant of the migrants‘
presence.65

Given their informal and irregular character, there is virtually no accurate or
reliable data on these migrations. Using Indian Census data on ‗place of birth‘ and ‗place
of last residence,‘ a recent study estimates that in 2001 there were some 3.1 to 3.7 million
Bangladeshis in India.66 On the other hand, estimates by government agencies, journalists
and the Hindu right have proffered ever-growing and often staggering numbers. In 2004,
Union Minister of State for Home Shriprakash Jaiswal informed Rajya Sabha (Upper
House of the Indian Parliament) that there were more than ‗12 million Bangladeshis‘
residing ‗illegally‘ in the country.67 The Indian Border Security Force (BSF) reportedly
estimates that between 1972 and 2005, some 1.2 million Bangladeshis who entered India
on tourist visas failed to leave the country.68 Even a recent World Bank study contends
that in terms of flows, the Indo-Bangladesh corridor is one of the most active globally,
coming a close second to flows across the US-Mexican border.69 The highest estimates
have, however, not surprisingly been presented by Hindu nationalist groups such as the
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BJP.70 In 2003, the BJP and its cohorts claimed that there were some 20 million irregular
Bangladeshis living in India.71

Although the continuing migration of Bangladeshis into India has become a
highly contentious issue in contemporary times, xenophobic programs occurred in
previous decades in north-eastern provinces. Because of their proximity to Bangladesh,
these provinces are believed to have received the largest flows of migrants. In the past as
well, substantial numbers of refugees moved into these states from the erstwhile East
Bengal (now Bangladesh) during the partition of the Indian sub-continent (into India and
East and West Pakistan in 1947) and subsequent formation of an independent nation-state
of Bangladesh (in 1971).72 The long histories of anti-immigrant tendencies in these areas
have not been systematically researched or documented. Nevertheless, a long-standing
pattern of hostility towards Bengali speakers has some resonance in the current antipathy
towards irregular Bangladeshi migrants. There has been a marked tendency to conflate
earlier groups of Bengali migrants/refugees with newer irregular migrants from
Bangladesh.73

Bhaumik writes about the Bangal Kheda movement (drive away Bengalis) in
Assam from the late 1940s onwards, provoked by the demographic and cultural changes
linked to the entry of Bengali-speaking populations from the east.74 In the 1960s, many
Bengali Hindus fled Assam and moved to other provinces like West Bengal and Tripura.
Anti-Bengali violence was witnessed as well in neighbouring Meghalaya during the
decades of the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1979-84, the All Assam Students Union
70
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(AASU) spearheaded an anti-foreigners‘ movement in Assam opposing the entry of
irregular Bangladeshis. It also demanded the expulsion of all people of Bengali descent
who had entered its territories after 1951.75 At the height of the movement, close to 2,000
Bengali-speaking Muslim immigrants were brutally massacred in Nellie.76 The violence
reportedly first broke out over the alleged abduction and rape of Assamese tribal Tiwa
women by Bengali Muslim migrants.77 It also unleashed the simmering resentment
against the settlement onto tribal lands of Bengali miyas from Mymensingh district of
East Bengal.

To this day, the strongest expressions of xenophobia against migrant
Bangladeshis are being witnessed in north-eastern provinces. Scholars like Hazarika have
argued that in these insurgent-prone, socially and politically unstable areas, the
continuous entry of substantial numbers of Bangladeshi migrants rapidly aggravates these
divisive, aggressive tendencies.78 Moreover, escalating anxieties about threatened cultural
or linguistic identities provide a powerful motivating force.79 For example, in a news
interview, Sarbananda Sanowal of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) party stated: ‗The
illegal migrants from Bangladesh are a major threat to our identity. We will become
foreigners in our own land unless we keep these people out of Assam.‘80

Over the last two decades, the exclusionary politics of the Hindu right have only
re-invigorated the rhetoric of fear and loathing surrounding these migrations. Highly
incendiary texts associated with the Hindu-right create the specter of an impending
catastrophe posed by the ‗enemy alien‘ threatening the long-term safety and security of
the Hindu-Indian nation.81 These migrations have been described as a ‗demographic
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aggression‘ and ‗silent invasion‘ of a ‗Muslim avalanche‘ unleashed on India by ‗millions
of illiterate, fanatical, hungry and highly motivated Muslims [who] have already settled
and spread themselves like a swarm of locusts in the lush green fields and forests of
Assam.‘82 Consistent with the political ideology of the Hindu right, these texts make a
distinction between Hindu and Muslim migrants from Bangladesh. The former are
characterized as ‗refugees‘ and as ‗victims‘ of ‗a most iniquitous political system based
on Islamic fundamentalism‘ while the latter are described as ‗infiltrators‘ who have yet to
be ‗punished‘ for this ‗ act of crime.‘83 Another propaganda text describes the
Bangladeshi migrations as the ‗ingredients of a grand design and strategy to demolish
India…surely, steadily and irreversibly.‘84

This exaggerated imagery has been unquestioningly adopted by many Indians,
including state authorities. In May 2005, in its judgment repealing the terms of the longcontroversial Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunals (IMDT) Act, the Supreme
Court described migration from Bangaldesh as ‗external aggression.‘85 The judgement
read:

The presence of such large numbers of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, which
run into millions, is in fact an aggression [emphasis ours] on the state of Assam
and has also contributed significantly in causing serious internal disturbances in
the shape of insurgency of alarming proportions.86

Even those opposed to the nationalist politics of the Hindu right have supported
the forcible expulsion of migrant Bangladeshis. Public discourses on migrants now
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represent them as ‗thieves, traitors and terrorists.‘87 In the past few years, growing
concerns about Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have only hardened these
perceptions. In an op-ed article, for instance, journalist TVR Shenoy argued:

There are as many as 20 million Bangladeshis scattered across India. Some are
genuine refugees, men and women fleeing persecution. But many are seeking to
make a quick buck at the Indians‘ expense. More worrying, an increasing number
are criminals allied to terrorists.88

Others have rejected the proposal to issue temporary work permits to the migrants.
Sanjay Nirupam, then affiliated with the Hindu right-wing Shiv Sena Party, attacked it as
follows:

With the battalions of the jobless swelling day after day in India, it is absurd to
roll out the red carpet for Bangladeshis. By admitting them into our own farms
and factories, the union government will rob our own people of their legitimate
right to work.‘89

This comment by an ordinary citizen now echoes the sentiments of many living in India:
‗Too many Bangladeshis are coming here without passports. They take our jobs, some
are terrorists. They need to be stopped.‘90

In this highly charged scenario, there are increasing reports of violence and
persecution of Bangladeshi migrants and other minority groups, including Indian
Muslims and Indian Bengalis. Even migrants from Indian provinces like Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh have been attacked in places like Assam, Meghalaya and Maharashtra. In
September 2008, vigilante groups from Assamese indigenous communities conducted a
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state-wide drive to locate ‗Bangladeshis.‘91 The following month, clashes between the
indigenous Bodo community and Muslim migrants (including irregular Bangladeshis) in
northern Assam contributed to more than 50 deaths and the displacement of more than
10,000 Muslim migrants.92

Malaysia

According to the Department of Immigration, there are 2.1 million documented
migrant workers in Malaysia.93 While the exact numbers are not known, estimates for
migrants in an irregular situation vary from half a million to five million persons.94 Many
of the registered migrants have arrived from twelve countries in the region including
ASEAN and neighbouring countries. The largest number of migrant workers is from
Indonesia followed by Nepal, India, Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Philippines,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and China, working in the manufacturing, agricultural, construction
and service sectors.95 As one of the most robust economies in South-east Asia, Malaysia
relies heavily on migrant workers to perform the 3D (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) jobs
commonly rejected by citizens. Even though their labour is indispensable to the
Malaysian economy, draconian control measures combined with the absence of cogent
immigration policies or immigrant quotas mean that migrants often face a raw deal from
unscrupulous employers, recruitment agencies and enforcement authorities.96
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There are some 100,000 refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless persons in the
country. By August 2008, the UNHCR had registered 41,405 asylum-seekers, nearly 90
percent from Myanmar. Since Malaysia has not formally accepted international human
rights instruments for the protection of refugees, like the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, many
refugees (even those registered by the UNHCR) are routinely treated as irregular
migrants by immigration authorities and RELA, the People‘s Volunteer Corps, or Itakan
Relawan Rakyat, used to control irregular migration. In a crackdown on irregular
migrants in 2005, then Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak confirmed this
conflation: ‗We will take action against anyone who is here illegally. There is no
exemption on this including those carrying letters, genuine or otherwise from the
UNHCR. If the UNHCR wishes to appeal after these people are arrested, it is up to them.
But it is up to us whether we accept the appeal or not.‘97 A 2003 Human Rights Watch
study censured the Malaysian government for not recognizing as refugees Indonesians
who had fled military operations and martial law in the war-torn Aceh province.98

Like many other destination countries, Malaysia has not ratified the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families. In
recent times, it has taken several steps that contravene the human rights of both
documented and irregular migrants. In February 2007, for example, Malaysia proposed
that migrant workers be confined to their kongsi (work areas) even when they are not
working and that their travel in the country be carefully monitored by authorities.99 Some
of the harshest measures of the Malaysian state have been directed at irregular migrants
who are increasingly unwelcome.100 Apprehended irregular migrants have been subjected
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to corporal punishment like whipping and caning.101 They have also been detained for
extended periods in camps that fail to meet minimum standards recommended by the
United Nations.102 In August 2002, the Philippines‘ government summoned the
Malaysian Ambassador Mohamad Taufik to hand over a formal complaint protesting the
mistreatment of irregular Filipina migrants.103 The Philippines Foreign Secretary Blas
Ople explained at a news conference that although the country did not expect ‗Hiltonstandard treatment‘ for its citizens in Malaysia, several reports had indicated that the
conditions in the detention centers were ‗unduly harsh.‘

Poor treatment is sometimes justified by making migrants scapegoats for
‗problems‘ like crime. RELA‘s Director-General Zaidon Asmuni declared in a recent
newspaper interview: ‗We have no more Communists at the moment, but we are now
facing illegal immigrants. As you know, illegal immigrants are enemy No. 2 in Malaysia
[following drugs as Enemy no. 1].‘104 Similarly, a RELA volunteer expressed a common
sentiment about migrants: ‗Especially the illegal immigrants from Indonesia, they always
give us a lot of trouble. They break into the house, they rob…steal everything. Most
Malaysians worry about it.‘105

Crackdown operations against irregular migrants have been carried out on a
regular basis. In 2005, the government launched ‗Operation Tegas‘ (meaning tough or
firm operation) to control the number of irregular migrants. 106 The Daily Express
newspaper quoted Sabah MP Wilfred Madius Tangau who urged ordinary Malaysians to
report the whereabouts of irregular migrants: ‗As we celebrate the coming Malaysia Day
101
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on September 16, we must stand united in support of the government‘s efforts in ridding
the state of illegal immigrants.‘107 Operation Tegas was renewed in December 2008
under conditions of global economic slowdown.108 During the operation in 2005,
thousands of Acehnese asylum-seekers were detained, many of them sentenced to jail or
whipping.
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Fahmi Idris revealed that some 100,000 Indonesian irregular migrants who had not been
paid by their employers were refusing to go back despite the constant threat of forcible
detention and expulsion.110

On March 17, 2007 at its Annual General Meeting, the Malaysian Bar Council
(Badan Peguam Malaysia) unanimously urged the government to use trained law
enforcement personnel and disband RELA.111 Set up originally in 1972 ‗to help maintain
security in the country and the well-being of the people‘ in an attempt to restrain the
spread of communism, the 2005 amendment to Malaysia‘s Essential Regulations Act
gave RELA workers extensive authority to enter or carry out searches of public and
private spaces without an arrest warrant, make arrests, provided the right to carry and use
firearms and to check the citizenship documents of anyone living in the country.112 With
nearly half a million volunteers, RELA‘s numerical strength exceeds the total number of
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Malaysian police and military personnel.113 Largely untrained, the volunteers receive an
allowance for their work and until mid-2007 received a special bonus based on the
number of migrants apprehended.114

Advocacy and migrant groups have heavily criticized the actions of RELA
workers who are accused of frequently abusing the extraordinary powers accorded to
them. RELA volunteers have come under attack for their treatment of migrants, for
confiscating personal property during raids (including clothing, jewellery and household
goods), for demanding bribes from detainees, and for deliberately destroying valid
identification documents. In 2007, Human Rights Watch described RELA as ‗little more
than a vigilante force to target foreigners‘ arguing that ‗the Malaysian government fans
xenophobia through its use of RELA.‘115 RELA members have also on occasion failed to
respect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. In one episode in January 2007, 45
men and 7 women asylum-seekers from Myanmar‘s Chin state were arrested and sent to
Lenggeng Detention Camp.116

On February 12 and 13, 2006, following an immigration raid conducted by RELA
in the Selayang area of the capital city Kuala Lumpur, bodies of five migrant workers
were discovered in a lake.117 Allegedly, they were victims of the excessive brutality
exhibited by someRELA workers. The following month, the Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrants and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions expressed their concern to the Malaysian government over the
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incident.118 The Malaysian government, however, did not offer an explanation. The same
year, an appeal by Jorge Bustamante, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants, to visit the country to assess the condition of migrants and refugees was also
ignored.119 In December 2008, despite accepting the allegations of maltreatment by some
volunteers, the Malaysian government unequivocally rejected any plans to dissolve
RELA emphasizing that ‗RELA has served the country well and has a useful purpose.‘120

Thailand

Thailand is one of the major migration destination countries in South-East Asia.
In 2007, there were more than 300,000 highly and semi-skilled migrant workers from
Western and East Asian countries in Thailand.121 Additionally, there were around
650,000 registered low-skilled migrant workers in Thailand from the Greater Mekong
Region, including countries like Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia. Another 1.3 million
migrants from these countries are believed to exist irregularly here. The largest number of
migrants are from Myanmar, believed to account for some 70-80 percent of migrant
workers. Over the past several decades, Thailand has also hosted a large number of
refugees, totalling several million by some accounts. It continues to host several hundred
thousand refugees to this date, albeit reluctantly.

Several categories of migrants have faced acute discrimination in this country,
living and working in inferior, exploitative conditions. These include refugees and
asylum-seekers, migrant workers in low skilled positions, and irregular migrants. More
than ever, unskilled migrant workers from the Greater Mekong Region are vulnerable to
abuse and exploitation. Because of their status, irregular migrants exist at the fringes of
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Thai society without social and legal protection. In addition, refugees and asylum-seekers
have been at risk, often treated as irregular migrants. Migrants can sometimes straddle
several of these categories at the same time which also has a bearing on their
vulnerability in this receiving state.

In 2008, a report by the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
(USCRI) ranked Thailand as one of the ten worst host countries worldwide for
refugees.122 Since early last year, Thai authorities have refused to accept as refugees
hundreds of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar, many of whom are believed to have
drowned in the Andaman Sea while trying to reach Thailand. 123 In an attempt to stem
additional flows, the Thai government threatened to detain them on a deserted island. At
the end of the year, it attracted widespread criticism for allowing its army to forcibly turn
back out hundreds of Rohingya refugees to sea, resulting in a large number of deaths.124
An independent human rights monitoring group, Arakan Project, revealed that several
groups of refugees were coerced by the Thai army into small boats with their hands
bound and set adrift with little food and water. The refugees drifted for more than two
weeks in the Andaman Sea before they were rescued by the Indian coastguard. It is
believed that nearly 500 refugees may have perished during the journey.125 Although the
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva initially denied any wrongdoing, eye-witness accounts
and photographs taken by tourists soon forced the Thai government to initiate an inquiry
into these human rights abuses.126
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Though not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or
its 1967 Protocol, Thailand has played host to large numbers of refugees from
neighbouring countries, especially Myanmar, for several decades. All the same, from the
late 1990s onwards, it has adopted a progressively hardnosed approach towards refugees.
In particular, after dissidents seized the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok and occupied the
Ratchaburi hospital in October 1999, Thai authorities moved all Burmese asylum-seekers
to camps close to the Thailand-Myanmar border and narrowed the criteria of
acceptance.127 The official stance hardened even further after Burmese refugees protested
outside the Myanmar embassy and The United Nations building in Bangkok in June
2003, when it threatened to expel them en masse from its territories. In 2005, it
announced that Burmese refugees living in urban areas would be moved to camps near
the border. In 2004, under extraordinary pressure from the Thai government, UNHCR
had to suspend the screening of asylum-seekers under the Refugee Determination System
(RDS).128

Refugee groups have criticized Thailand for failing to respect the human rights of
refugees, many of whom are ‗warehoused‘ and face severe restrictions on settlement
outside camps.129 This situation has been particularly serious for Burmese refugees, some
of whom have been ‗warehoused‘ for more than 20 years.130 Refugees are forced to
depend on humanitarian aid or seek work illegally outside the camps. It is believed that
up to 40 percent of refugees find such employment in order to survive, facing the risk of
being detained and deported as irregular migrants.131 In areas like Mae Hong Song,
refugees are employed in low wage sectors like agriculture but are forced to bribe police
127
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regularly to evade arrest and detention for defying the rules. Refugees from the Greater
Mekong Region are allowed to register to work as migrant labour in selected, low-waged
sectors of the Thai economy. However, they lose their status as refugees and their names
are disclosed to their home governments which discourages many from registering in this
program.

Forced detention and deportation of refugees have become increasingly
commonplace. According to the World Refugee Survey 2008, the Thai Ministry of
Interior lists on its website as one of its priority tasks: ‗to intercept and drive back
refugees.‘132 Over the last two years, the Thai government repatriated several hundred
Hmong asylum-seekers and refugees from Laos. In early 2007, it deported 16 Hmong
asylum-seekers from Laos before UNHCR could assess their cases. Reportedly, the
deportees were immediately incarcerated by Lao authorities upon their return. A few days
later, another 150 Hmong asylum-seekers were forcibly returned to Laos even though
UNHCR had recognized them as refugees. In June 2007, two Lao Hmong refugees who
reportedly attempted to kill themselves in fear of repatriation revealed that Thai
authorities brutally coerced them into giving consent for repatriation. In 2008, Thai
authorities declared their intention to repatriate 7,800 Hmong refugees living in a closed
camp in Petchabun province, ‗no matter how many bullet wounds they have.‘133

Like Thai policy on refugees, policies towards migrant workers have widened the
gap between migrants and citizens. For example, a ‗Provincial Decree on Migrant
Workers‘ adopted by the government of Phuket in December 2006 has severely inhibited
the movement and basic rights of migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and
Laos.134 They are no longer permitted to own cell phones, drive motor bikes or cars or to
leave their residences between 8 pm and 6 am. Since mid-2007, the decree has been
adopted by seven other Thai provinces on grounds of ‗national security.‘ Similarly, the
132
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Thai government adopted another controversial law in March 2008 which rewards
informers in apprehending irregular migrants.135 Migrant advocacy groups have urged the
authorities to repeal this law, arguing that it ‗will create more divisions between migrants
and Thai communities and [inflame] xenophobia.‘136

Advocacy groups like the Migrant Working Group and Labour Rights Promotion
Network have also censured Thai authorities for inflaming xenophobic sentiments
through public statements that vilify migrants. In November 2007, they expressed their
dismay over the ‗cultural insensitivities and prejudice against foreign workers‘ exhibited
by Veerayuth Yeamampur, then governor of Samut Sakhon province in an official
letter.137 The communiqué issued to employers of factories in the province described
migrant workers from the Greater Mekong Region as ‗problems,‘ causing ‗criminal
problems‘ and ‗security problems‘:

They [migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos] are also now trying
to organize cultural performances at social occasions and fairs, which is not
suitable. These activities are not be supported because it will make the community
feel that these people are the owners of the community and it could also create
security problems…We should not allow them to organize cultural ceremonies at
all.138
Official policy resonates with Thai opinions on migrant workers. Citizens‘
attitudes have generally been unfavourable towards Burmese migrants and refugees.139
An ABAC public opinion survey sponsored by the International Labour Organization
(ILO) and United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM) on attitudes towards migrant
workers carried out in 2006 showed that nearly 59 percent of respondents wanted the
135
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government to ban the entry of migrant labour. 140 Only nine percent of respondents were
supportive of the entry of additional migrant workers. More than 80 percent of
participants believed that migrant labour had an adverse impact on the wages of Thai
workers, in particular those with lower skills and wages. While many participants
indicated that they would report the abuse of migrant workers, they did not favour equal
rights and opportunities for them. Forty percent of the participants were opposed to
migrants‘ receiving the same wages as Thai citizens. Similarly, half of the respondents
felt that migrant workers should not receive the same Social Security benefits.

Although migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos added an
estimated $2 billion to the country‘s total GDP of USD$177 billion in 2005, a majority of
respondents believed that they did not contribute positively to the Thai economy.141 More
than 70 percent of the participants accepted that migrants were ‗hard-working,‘ though
only 20 percent considered them to be ‗honest‘ and ‗loyal.‘ Respondents also lacked
adequate knowledge about Thai policies towards migrant workers, with only three of the
eight policies being familiar to half of the participants. Significantly, a majority of
respondents indicated that they were influenced by negative media reporting on migrant
workers.

Libya

The most explosive bout of anti-immigrant aggression witnessed in Libya to date
erupted in Zawiya (also spelled as Zawiyya, Ezzaouia and Az zawiya), west of Tripoli, in
September 2000. Although government officials played down the incident and reported
only seven casualties, international media coverage revealed that the numbers of those
killed were much higher. According to the World Refugee Survey (2001), several
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hundred migrants were killed and some 20,000 African migrants fled Libya.142 Other
estimates indicate that 50 or so migrants died due to the violence.143 The chain of events
that sparked the violence is still unclear. To date, the Libyan government has not
disclosed details of the terrible episode even though it claims to have conducted an
investigation into it.144 According to the Sudanese independent daily newspaper Akhbar
al-Yom, some 50 people were killed in clashes between Libyans and migrants from Sudan
and Chad.145 Similarly, BBC News reported that a trivial dispute ostensibly triggered the
clashes between Libyans and migrants from Chad and Sudan, subsequently spreading to
Tripoli.146 Another BBC news article indicated that a petty fight among onlookers at a
football match provided the initial spark.147 A senior Libyan official informed Human
Rights Watch in 2000 that the first clash took place between Libyans and Nigerian
migrants over the latter allegedly ‗teasing girls.‘148 He emphasized that ‗the police
intervened immediately and took the necessary measures and arrested those who were
involved.‘149

The cause of the initial clash may have been insignificant, but the violence was
widespread and clearly directed at immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. One article
reported that large gangs of Libyans chanting ‗blacks must go‘ went on a rampage in a
migrant neighbourhood, killing some 50 Sudanese and Chad workers.150 The violence
then quickly spread to other areas like Zahrah and Benghazi. On September 25, a mob of
around 1,000 Libyans reportedly attacked and set ablaze a locality occupied by Ghanaian
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migrants.151 A repatriated Nigerian migrant later stated that ‗the only way to describe
Libya [was] hellfire.‘ Other narratives argue that much of the violence was directed at
Nigerian immigrants who were accused by officials of engaging in criminal activities and
inciting the clashes.152
Libya‘s leader Muammar Gaddafi blamed the attacks on foreign ‗hidden hostile
hands‘ seeking to undermine his vision of African unity.153 Eyewitness accounts,
however, point out that gangs of youth carried out the rampage with the direct and
indirect complicity of state authorities. News of sporadic attacks on migrants persisted
even three months after the first bout of violence.154 Migrants from countries like Chad,
Sudan, Gambia, Ghana, Congo and Nigeria complained that they were viciously attacked
and their host and home governments had failed to protect them.155 Repatriated migrants
from countries like Nigeria described the racist conduct meted out to them by locals,
declaring that Libyans ‗disliked blacks.‘ They said that they were called derogatory
names like ‗monkey‘ in the streets and even Libyan children often covered their noses in
their presence.156 A returned Ghanaian migrant noted: ‗It was not easy, because being a
black man (in Libya), you can‘t live there simply. You can‘t move around freely. The
problem is: Libyans don‘t like blacks.‘157

In a report to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2001, Maurice GleleAhanhanzo, then Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance condemned this xenophobic
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aggression as ‗witch hunts targeting blacks.‘158 He cited an article that appeared on 22
November 2000 in the Ivorian daily newspaper Fraternite Matin:

Immigrants said that they were victims of racist attacks resulting in deaths,
expulsions, and repatriations for the luckiest…immigrants from sub-Saharan
Africa and especially nationals of Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Niger,
Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and even Côte d‘Ivoire , were treated by locals and
especially by young rebels in a way reminiscent of apartheid [emphasis in
original]. The authorities, who attribute this violence to clashes between gangs
from black Africa, expelled several thousand back to their countries of origin.159
Another report in the Jeune Afrique newspaper described the event as a ‗pogrom‘:

It was difficult for the Libyan authorities to maintain for very long their rather
anodyne version of the dramatic events that had taken place at Ezzaouia at the end
of September. Six people died (one of whom was a Libyan). This official figure
was very quickly refuted by survivors of the pogrom who managed to leave
Jamahiriya [Libya]. In point of fact, several hundred African immigrant workers
were killed…the tidal wave of immigrants seeking refuge in embassy compounds
and the complaints of NGOs eventually revealed the seriousness of the situation.
Abuja then chartered a plane which, in the course of seven trips, evacuated 450
Nigerian nationals. Almost 5000 are waiting to leave the former Libyan El
Dorado. John Jerry Rawlings, the President for Ghana, went to Tripoli to recover
his nationals. Sudanese and Chadians are also leaving the Jamahiriya in droves.
The two million Africans residing legally in Libya are completely terrified. 160
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During the repatriation of Nigerian migrants in the aftermath of the violence, the
Libyan embassy Charge D’Affaires in Abuja was quoted in the Nigerian Post Express
newspaper as saying that the repatriations were ‗good riddance to bad rubbish.‘161 He
underscored that migrants residing illegally would be ‗fished out,‘ and blamed Nigerian
migrants for the mounting levels of crime: ‗Some of them who can‘t get a job get
involved in drug peddling, prostitution and armed robbery, which our society does not
like.‘ Partly seeking to assuage popular sentiments, many African migrants whom the
authorities blamed for the clashes were quickly expelled by the state. 162 Significantly, the
clashes erupted shortly after the General People‘s Congress (Parliament) announced their
plans to tighten immigration by apprehending and deporting migrants without papers.
Many of the migrants had existed in Libya for an extended period without proper
documentation and their presence had been tolerated by local authorities.

Since it is conducted largely through informal and irregular channels, accurate
figures for migrants may be hard to calculate. The Libyan government puts the number
of legal migrants at around 600,000 and of irregular migrants between 750,000 and 1.2
million.163 Other assessments provide much higher figures of 2 to 2.5 million migrants,
including some one to one and a half million migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.164
Reportedly, there are a substantial number of migrants from countries like Chad and
Sudan. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are
currently some two million migrants in Libya consisting of slightly more than thirty
percent of the country‘s population of 6 million.165 In the last few years, Libya has
become a stopover point for African migrants headed to Western Europe.
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It is also important to note that Libya had pursued an open-door policy towards
migrants for several decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, the economic boom that
followed the discovery of oil attracted many migrants from neighbouring countries like
Sudan.166 In the 1990s, when the air and arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN
Security Council isolated the country more than ever from the West, Gaddafi opened
Libya to the rest of Africa.167 Frustrated by the so-called uncooperativeness of Arab
states, and in a radical shift in foreign policy, he recast himself as an African leader
inviting Sub-Saharan Africans to seek employment in the country in the spirit of PanAfrican solidarity. Previously the destination point for mostly North African migrants, a
major surge took place in trans-Saharan migration to Libya. The country became a major
destination country with some one million migrants entering its borders during that
decade. Migrants filled up positions in the informal and labour-intensive construction
sectors doing menial jobs that citizens did not want to perform.

The welcome mat extended to African migrants was already wearing thin by the
mid-1990s when the Libyan economy had shrunk, partly due to sanctions, and inflation
levels were extraordinarily high. Unemployment rates for citizens reached as high as 30
percent.168 As migrant numbers continued to climb upwards, the Libyan government
announced its plans to cut down on foreign labour and tackle irregular migration. In
1995, 335,000 migrants left Libya.169 Of these, 200,000 were deported after being
apprehended in intensive raids called kasha while others left voluntarily after being given
a one-week grace period to quit the country.170 The Libyan state‘s unease over the alleged
entry of fundamentalist Islamic groups abetted by Sudan further provoked these
widespread raids. In 1996, however, the Libyan authorities were forced to relax these
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expulsions after receiving widespread criticism following an incident in which several
hundred Sudanese migrants were killed. Apparently, the fatalities occurred after 4,000
Sudanese migrants imprisoned in Hawza Elenab fled the detention centre and began
protesting outside the Sudanese embassy.

Since 2003, when sanctions against Libya were lifted, the country has faced
mounting pressure from the EU to curb irregular migration to Western European
countries. In particular, demands from Italy have had an added effect on state policies,
and especially towards irregular migrants. Not surprisingly, the official stance in Libya
now is that irregular migrants contribute to ‗problems‘ that have ‗an impact on the
economic, sanitary, social and security situation.‘171 In 2006 at a meeting for an EUAfrican migration and development conference, Gaddafi informed participants: ‗I support
your efforts to stop illegal immigration and I wish that migration stops because Libya is
one of the countries paying dearly for it.‘172

Public attitudes towards migrants have not been systematically recorded through
large-scale surveys in Libya. Press coverage on immigration has not yet been examined
critically. Nevertheless, the few studies available make it clear that xenophobic attitudes
and practices are rampant. Immigrants, especially those from other African countries, are
commonly treated with contempt and derision. A Human Rights Watch report has
highlighted the widespread antagonism and hostility, including physical and verbal
attacks, harassment, and extortion, encountered by migrants in Libya.173 Cultural,
religious, and racial differences between migrants and citizens have contributed to some
extent to the growth of this animosity.
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CAUSES OF XENOPHOBIA

This section provides a brief review of various theories commonly advanced to explain
xenophobia.

Most of these explanations were developed to try and explain the

phenomenon in migrant destination countries of the North. However, where possible, this
paper makes reference to the applicability of such theories to the rise of xenophobia in
the global South.

The socio-biological approach to xenophobia proposes that human beings are
biologically predisposed to favouring their own and discriminating against outsiders. It
uses the analogy of infants shying away from strangers to argue that xenophobia is an
innate behaviour and central to the human make-up.174 Accordingly, conditions of
economic and emotional insecurity simply exacerbate these ‗natural‘ tendencies. In other
words, violence against outsiders is a spontaneous, inevitable aspect of the human
condition. Following this approach, negative outcomes can be expected from increasing
levels of immigration.

However, not all immigration-countries have experienced similar xenophobic
reactions and some countries that have received very few immigrants have also registered
very high levels of xenophobia. Some scholars have justifiably criticized this approach
for providing validation to an anti-immigration stance.175 It is worrying that this approach
can be used to justify the marginalization, exploitation, and expulsion of migrant groups.
In 2000, for example, during a public debate on rising levels of xenophobia in Slovenia, a
journalist defended it as a ‗normal, understandable‘ response when he observed: ‗If
foreigners don‘t leave…the local people will try to starve them out which is of course
scandalous but understandable [emphasis ours].‘176
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What happens when different groups of people come in contact with each other?
Is the outcome of this contact inevitably tension and conflict between the groups as
proposed by the socio-biology approach? Or does contact lead to tolerance? In this
context, does social contact between migrant and non-migrant groups produce positive or
negative results? Gordon Allport‘s original approach held that certain types of contact
can diminish prejudice, though the reverse could also hold true. 177 He outlined four broad
conditions under which contact between groups would result in greater harmony and
understanding between them. First, the groups in question should have or perceive equal
status. Second, the contact should be effective in that the groups must work together,
relying on each other to achieve a common goal. Third, he emphasized the need for intergroup cooperation rather than competition. Fourth, he suggested that inter-group contact
will be more effective if it is supported by authorities and the guidelines that shape these
interactions are clearly provided.

There has been considerable scholarly debate on the nature of contact as well as
the facilitating conditions outlined by Allport.178 Although some scholars contend that
contact almost always leads to discord and disagreement, others have suggested that it
can actually diminish discriminatory behaviour, contributing to greater tolerance and
understanding between diverse groups.179 One of the strongest proponents of the latter
approach is Pettigrew who has long maintained that contact leads to friendliness between
groups. In fact, he proposes that even when the conditions outlined by Allport are not
met, contact can correct existing biases and increase empathy towards out-groups. 180
Legge‘s study of Germany concludes that the marked variations in contact with
foreigners between the eastern and western parts of the country contributed to the uneven
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growth of xenophobia.181 Residents of former West Germany, who were three times more
likely to come into contact with migrants at work or in their neighbourhood, displayed
much more favourable feelings towards them. Mclaren‘s analysis of Eurobarometer data
deduces that contact can have a constructive effect on native attitudes especially in
relation to perceived realistic and symbolic threat (examined later in this paper).182 She
argues that in contexts where large numbers of immigrants exist, friendship between
native and migrant populations can substantially ease the level of perceived threat.

More recently, Pettigrew and Tropp‘s meta-analysis draws parallel inferences.
Ninety-five percent of their sample reported that lower inter-group prejudice
corresponded with increased contact even though only ten percent of the sample
examined friendship and a limited nineteen percent of the sample followed Allport‘s
guiding conditions.183 Notably, contact between different racial and ethnic groups showed
some of the strongest effects; this has strong resonance for migration researchers and
policy-makers. Like Mclaren, they deduced that reducing anxiety during contact would
have a marked impact on prejudice, reducing it by one-fifth or even one-quarter in some
cases.
In Allport‘s ther concept of ‗scapegoating,‘ people displace their frustration onto
convenient targets, thereby obscuring the actual causes of their anxiety.184 The scapegoats
are invariably weaker, vulnerable, minority groups and the process operates on an
individual level. In the context of xenophobia, immigrants, migrants and refugees are
made convenient scapegoats, unfairly and erroneously blamed for various problems such
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as housing, unemployment and crime.185 As non-citizens who may already be
marginalized because of their status, migrants make easy scapegoats and victims. The
process operates not only on an individual level; it is a social process and the media,
political parties, and state all contribute to it, influencing each other and society at
large.186

In focus group interviews on asylum-related issues conducted by the Londonbased Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a majority of British participants
exhibited hostility to asylum-seekers.187 Participants held them responsible for housing
shortages and felt that they were preferentially provided accommodation by local
authorities. They also blamed asylum-seekers for unemployment, not realizing that the
latter are not allowed to work. When informed of this, many participants declared that
asylum-seekers were unwilling to work and thereby not contributing to the economy.

Another common social issue for which migrants are made scapegoats is crime. In
many host countries, there is an enduring belief that migrants are responsible for
increasing levels of crime. In a study of Greek police attitudes towards migrant groups,
they were described as a ‗huge problem.‘ 188 In the words of a study participant:

Migration has harmed Greece to a very great extent. Migrants have made us
fearful of sleeping in our yards and balconies in the summer, as we used to before.
Everyone lives in fear now. Greece has become a fenceless vineyard in which
anyone can enter whenever they want and the results are evident. They made us
install alarms in our houses and sleep with a gun under the pillow. I do not think
migrants are a good thing for Greece.189
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However, these perceptions are often divorced from reality. In the United States,
for example, data from the 2000 Census Survey demonstrated that the incarceration rate
of US-born was four times higher (3.51 percent) than that for foreign-born residents (0.86
percent).190 The foreign-born rate (0.57 percent) was half that of non-Hispanic white
citizens (1.71 percent) and 13 times less than the rate for native black men (11.61
percent). Despite lower levels of education, the incarceration rates for migrant groups like
Mexicans (0.70 percent), Guatemalans and Salvadoran immigrants (0.52 percent) were
low. Interestingly, many of these groups are often vilified as ‗illegals‘ and blamed for
rising criminal activity. Scapegoating tendencies and public rhetoric of fear and loathing
collectively shape and define the contours of symbolic threat posed by immigrants. That
is, they transform diverse migrant groups in the public imagination as an undifferentiated
mass, representing a ‗menace‘ and ‗threat‘ to the well-being and security of host
populations.

When migrants are made scapegoats for social ills, negative and biased
stereotypes are produced, re-produced and accepted as ‗common sense.‘ This rhetoric not
only instigates fear and loathing by demonizing migrants as the ‗Other,‘ it also excuses
the poor treatment of migrants.191 It creates divisions between citizens and migrant
groups as ‗Us‘ and ‗Them.‘ Here, the latter are attributed qualities that are negative and
which dehumanize, debase, and degrade them. They are viewed as somehow inferior and
not worthy of equal or fair treatment. Differences between migrant and native
populations are exaggerated while similarities are overlooked, maintaining social distance
between migrants and native groups.

Exclusionary, divisive, and dynamic rhetoric is created, shaped, and sustained by
the media, mainstream politicians, extreme right-wing parties, and even citizens.
Sometimes also characterized as ‗discriminatory discourses,‘ the rhetoric of fear and
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loathing generally contains some constant features.192 However, discriminatory
discourses do respond to changing contexts, mutating in form and substance, which adds
to their potency and effectiveness. Established discourses on migrants as ‗criminals,‘
‗carriers of disease,‘ and ‗job-stealers‘ now combine with newer ideas about ‗threats‘ to
‗national identity‘ and ‗national security.‘193 Hagendoorn and Sniderman‘s survey of
prejudice in the Netherlands, for example, showed that in terms of perceived threat, the
danger posed by immigrants to cultural identity far outweighed other concerns for
participants, such as threat to economic well-being and safety.194
The term ‗asylum-seeker‘ has been transformed in recent years from a legal term
referring to those seeking a safe haven to becoming synonymous with ‗illegal migrants‘
or ‗bogus‘ refugees.195 While campaigning for local elections in West Yorkshire in 2004,
Nick Griffin, chairman of the far-right British National Party and one of his deputies,
Mark Collett, described asylum-seekers in a demeaning way as ‗cockroaches.‘ ‗I often
say asylum-seekers are like cockroaches, because it‘s take, take, take,‘ stated the latter,
urging people to vote for his party ‗if [they] want these people out and stop the asylumseekers coming in.‘196 In South Africa and Botswana, immigrants, migrant labourers, and
refugees are denigrated as ‗kwerekwere‘ and ‗amakwerekwere‘ or people who speak with
strange accents.197 The term also carries other pejorative references, such the ‗darkest of
the dark-skinned,‘ people from (culturally and economically) backward countries, and
‗primitives,‘ ‗savages‘ or ‗barbarians.‘198
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Grillo‘s account of opposition to proposed housing for asylum-seekers at a hotel
in Saltdean, a well-to-do middle-class suburb in the seaside resort of Brighton and Hove,
England, shows how popular exclusionary discourses on immigration at a national level
can manifest themselves at the local scale.199 More importantly, the study reveals the
manner in which the national ‗moral panic‘ concerning refugees shaped and was
subsequently reproduced by this smaller community who protested that they would be
‗swamped by many more [asylum-seekers], with the school and health services overrun‘
and ‗crime rates will rocket,‘ ‗our streets will become unsafe for women, children and
older members of our community‘ and ‗they will steal washing off the lines.‘200 Arguing
that they were ‗law-abiding, tax-paying residents appalled at the influx of people from
another land and culture,‘ residents sought to justify their resistance to the hostel on the
grounds that they were not opposed to ‗genuine asylum-seekers but against those who
don‘t have a right to be here that the Government are letting in.‘201
Material produced by the Saltdean Residents‘ Action Group (SRAG) contended
that their ancestors did not fight the last war ‗so this country could be turned into a
foreign land and overrun with every Tom, Dick and Harry that cares to drop in
uninvited.‘202 During public protests, residents held banners and placards that expressed
sentiments familiar in many British mainstream and tabloid newspapers: ‗Homes for our
elderly, not bogus asylum-seekers [emphasis ours].‘203 Although the SRAG sought to
distance itself from the British National Party (BNP) which participated in these protests,
many of its arguments ironically intersected with those of the party.

Xenophobia has also been tied to the exclusionary impulse of nation-building
processes and nationalism. Immigration and the presence of immigrants may simply
exaggerate this impulse, argue some scholars. In her work on immigration and national
identity in Europe, Triandafyllidou observes that the continued entry of political refugees
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and economic migrants has posed a fundamental challenge to European nation-states.204
Receiving states have to manage the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity produced by
immigration. They are also confronted with the task of dealing with the immigrant
‗Other‘ who challenges the cultural identity of the nation-state. Similarly in South Africa,
the rise of xenophobia after 1994 has been attributed to the redefinition of ‗insiders‘ and
‗outsiders‘ that accompanied the post-apartheid nation-building project.205

A related perspective links the growth of xenophobic sentiments to the
development of aggressive forms of nationalism, in which the tendencies to eliminate or
prohibit are much more strongly evident. In particular, the new Right has espoused
notions of ethno-nationalism which include only people belonging to their own
nationality, excluding immigrants and other ethnic minorities.206 This form of nationalism
constructs the idealized notion of a geographical area being occupied by people from
certain races or ethnicities. Here, the restrictive notion of national community is formed
through birth and descent.

A noteworthy development tied to the resurgence of xenophobia, witnessed
especially in Western European countries over the past two or so decades, is the growth
of extreme right-wing political formations. Sometimes described as Radical Right-Wing
Populist Parties (RRP Parties) or the New Right, they have not emerged strongly in all
countries that have experienced anti-immigrant hostility and differ somewhat in their
ideological roots and form.207 Despite these variations, the New Right shares the
fundamental trait of a hostile, belligerent rhetoric concerning ‗foreigners‘ or immigrants

204

Triandafyllidou, Anna 2001 Immigrants and National Identity in Europe, Routledge: London; See also
Triandafyllidou, Anna 2000 ‗‗Racists? Us? Are you joking?‘: the discourse of social exclusion of
immigrants in Greece and Italy‘ in King, Russell et al (eds) El Dorado or Fortress: Migration in South
Europe, Macmillan and St. Martin‘s Press: Houndsmill, pp. 186-205
205
Peberdy, Sally 2001 ‗Imagining Immigration: Inclusive Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994
South Africa‘, Africa Today, 48 (3), pp. 15-32.
206
Rydgren, Jens 2006 Tax Populism to Ethnic Nationalism: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western
World, Berghahn Books: New York
207
Rydgren, Jens 2006 From Tax Populism to Ethnic Nationalism: Radical Right-Wing Populism in
Sweden, Berghahn Books: New York

47

and an intense opposition to immigration.208 Some scholars have argued that the growing
popularity of the New Right is largely an expression of the widespread prejudice against
immigrants among West European populations. These parties have channelled growing
anxieties and unease over broader (social and economic) changes in Europe and
manipulated general resentment over immigration to their advantage. They have used
new and old myths surrounding immigration, culture, and national identity to expand
their sphere of influence in these countries.

In several Western European countries, the pervasiveness and popularity of the
New Right has reached an alarming level. They have assumed positions of political
importance at the regional, national and local level, successfully introducing their
exclusionary agenda to the centre-stage of mainstream politics. Even in countries where
they are less powerful politically, they vitiate the political and social scene by breeding
intolerance and fear of diversity. More alarmingly, they negatively influence mainstream
parties to adopt an inflexible stance towards immigration. Mainstream political parties in
countries that have experienced strong growth in the far right have openly embraced the
xenophobic rhetoric of these parties.209

Many examples can be given, especially in the context of Western Europe. The
Front National (or National Front) for instance, which is currently the third largest
political party in France, has campaigned using an aggressively anti-immigrant program
that calls for a moratorium on immigration, forcible expulsion of ‗non-white‘ immigrants,
and radical restructuring of citizenship laws.210 At a political rally in April 2007, Front
National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen asserted that immigration represented a threat to
France: ‗This is just the start of mass immigration. If we do nothing, we will be
208
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submerged.‘211 Le Pen gained prominence during the 1980s with his infamous slogan
connecting immigration with unemployment: ‗two million unemployed, two million
migrants.‘212

The Vlaams Blok, issued a seventy-point xenophobic program in 1991 aimed at
establishing an independent and homogeneous Flemish homeland in Belgium. The
program included a ‗watertight‘ end to immigration, immediate expulsion of migrants
who were undocumented, convicted of criminal activity or unemployed for more than
three months, ‗discouragement‘ and ‗encouragement‘ measures for legal migrants to quit
the country, and segregated schools and residences for natives and immigrants. The
party‘s platform has received increasing electoral support in recent years.

213

Although a

2005 High Court ruling forced the party to disband, it managed to collect 23 and 24
percent of the votes in European and Flemish polls in 2004 signalling strong support for
its policies.214

Less popular than some of its European counterparts, the mandate of the British
National Party (BNP) clearly excludes ethnic minorities by seeking to guarantee ‗the
continued existence, as the clearly dominant ethnic, cultural and political group, of the
native peoples of these islands—the English, Scots, Irish and Welsh—together with the
limited numbers of peoples of European descent who arrived as refugees or economic
immigrants centuries or decades ago, and who have fully integrated into our society.‘215

In April 2008, Italians brought back to power the centre-right coalition
government of Silvio Berlesconi‘s People of Freedom Party and its ally, the far right
Northern League party, approving an election campaign that crudely linked crime and
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immigration.216 The Northern League scored more than 8 percent of the votes, doubling
its performance from the previous election. One of its election posters featured an
aboriginal with the caption: ‗They were also subjected to immigration and now they live
on reserves.‘217 The Northern League‘s fierce resistance to immigration had been evident
earlier as well. In June 2003, the League‘s leader Umberto Bossi allegedly informed an
Italian newspaper that boats carrying irregular migrants should be shot out of the water
with cannons:
After the second or third warning, boom…the cannon roars. Without any beating
about the bush, the cannon that blows everyone out of the water. Otherwise, this
business will never end. Illegal migrants must be hounded out, either nicely or
nastily…There comes a time when it is necessary to resort to the use of force.218

In 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance asked the Swiss government to
explain inflammatory campaign posters created and widely distributed by the right-wing
Swiss People‘s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei or SVP).219 Now the strongest party in
Switzerland, the SVP‘s poster featured three white sheep kicking a black sheep against
the backdrop of the Swiss flag with the caption ‗for more security.‘220 Another poster
featured several black hands grabbing a stack of Swiss passports above the phrase ‗stop
mass naturalizations.‘221 An SVP member declared that ‗the black sheep is not any black
sheep that does not fit into the family. It‘s the foreign criminal who doesn‘t belong here,
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the one that doesn‘t obey Swiss law. We don‘t want him.‘222 Claiming that immigrants
commit a disproportionate share of violent crimes and abuse Swiss social and welfare
benefits, one of the party‘s 2007 election platforms was to push for a law that would
sanction the immediate deportation of immigrant families whose member(s) were found
guilty of crime or benefits fraud.223

Even though attention has centered largely on more well-known far right political
formations, smaller fringe groups that actively engage in hate crimes motivated by
xenophobia and racism are flourishing in areas like Russia. A recent report on the
Russian Federation by Doudou Diene, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance noted this disturbing
development.224 Russian officials have estimated their numbers to be between 10,000 and
20,000 while human rights groups give a much higher estimate of 50,000.225

Cultural differences between migrant and host populations can contribute to
hostility towards selected migrant groups, especially when there is striking diversity.226
The 2008 Annual Report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)
notes that non-Western cultural attire, like headscarves for Muslim women, made them
more visible targets of xenophobic attacks.227 In newer manifestations of racism and
xenophobia, cultural differences and identities are playing an increasingly important part.
In Europe, Stolcke argues that cultural identity, traditions, and heritage have
circumscribed the contemporary rhetoric of national inclusion and exclusion.228
Immigrants from the poor south, and more recently from the east, are seen as ‗strangers‘
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or ‗alien‘ to the common cultural heritage of Europeans. This form of ‗cultural
fundamentalism‘ invokes the notion of a homogeneous culture tied to nationality,
citizenship, and territory.229

While all non-Western cultures are seen as threatening to some extent, certain
cultural traditions are now being seen as fundamentally incompatible with European
values. In particular, cultural values and practices of Muslim immigrants have become
central to current political debates on immigrant integration and incorporation in
countries like the Netherlands, France and Germany. Because it is not expressed in
overtly racist terms, the new ‗symbolic‘ or ‗cultural‘ racism, which uses the logic of
seemingly insurmountable cultural incompatibilities, is far more socially acceptable than
‗biological racism‘ (based on color and racial differences).230 This new manifestation of
racism in Europe is a combination of racism and xenophobia. Fekete terms it as ‗xenoracism‘ suggesting that it is racist in substance yet xenophobic in form. 231 ‗Xeno-racism‘
simultaneously perpetuates racism in a new guise and conceals its sharp opposition to
immigrants.

Some scholars prefer to see xenophobia as having historical roots. For some,
xenophobia is the direct consequence of intensified and uneven globalization.
Globalization is seen as a paradoxical set of processes marked with real closures in a
celebratory rhetoric of borderless flows and boundless opportunities.232 With its emphasis
on the free movement of capital, globalization has accentuated the economic disparities
between countries and regions. It has also sharpened the divisions between social classes,
and rural and urban areas within these countries. This in turn exacerbates, rather than
diminishes, migration pressures. As flows of capital, goods, and people rise, it weakens
the boundaries of states. Contradictorily, nation-states attempt to manage these
transnational impulses by trying to stem the flow of migrants through stronger
immigration controls, directed largely at unskilled and involuntary migrants. The
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emergence, under globalization, of transnational migrant communities who display
loyalties and affiliations with both receiving and origin countries, are seen as a further
challenge to the sovereignty and character of nation-states. The tensions between nationstates and migratory flows are therefore magnified through deepening globalization.

The restructuring of global labour markets places migrants increasingly in the
peripheral service sectors that often exclude possibilities of citizenship and makes them
more vulnerable to exploitation.233 The acceleration of flows (of capital, goods and
people) heightens citizens‘ anxieties and fears, stimulating a stronger fixation with
belonging and identities, which in turn exaggerates exclusionary tendencies through
xenophobia and other intolerances.234 These insecurities are managed by treating migrant
groups as ‗unwanted‘ and making them scapegoats for social problems, thus exacerbating
their social insecurity.

Another common stream of materialist analysis proposes that real competition
over limited resources contributes to xenophobic sentiments among native populations.
During periods of economic crisis when resources shrink and jobs and housing are scarce,
rivalry between migrants and natives becomes more acute. Here, immigration is seen as a
more or less negative force whose outcomes are almost always detrimental for host
populations. Migrant inflows decrease the numbers of jobs available for citizens, create a
surplus pool of labour, and result in reduced wages for both citizens and migrants.
Another version views immigration as a ‗zero sum game‘ where the benefits from inflows are offset or neutralized by the costs associated with it.

It has been argued by some that perceived rather than real economic threats
contribute to xenophobic tendencies. Fears and anxieties are generally elevated during
uncertain economic circumstances. Consequently, people in weaker economic
circumstances or lower classes exhibit the highest propensity to develop xenophobic
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attitudes. For example, results from the 2003 Eurobarometer survey reveal that
individuals in the lowest income category displayed the strongest hostility towards
migrant groups.235 SAMP‘s 2006 survey of South African attitudes made a similar
finding.236 Scholars like O‘Connell have contradictorily shown that anti-immigrant
hostility is also displayed by some affluent communities and wealthier countries.237 Some
of the recent anti-immigrant political movements in Western Europe have appeared in
some of the wealthiest countries.

The evidence and opinion on the economic impact of immigration is rather mixed.
Some researchers have established that immigration does affect the economy adversely,
increasing unemployment.238 Conversely, other scholars argue that immigration has a
mostly beneficial influence on host populations. The latter have argued that the
relationship between economic structures and population size is not so straightforward.
The idea that migrants ‗steal‘ jobs is based on the flawed notion that the number of jobs
in an economy is fixed.239 Immigrants often create jobs in host countries thereby
benefitting local economies.240 This is very much the case when they are employed in the
informal sector. Immigrants also provide a valuable service for host populations by often
performing the worst jobs in host societies, unwanted by native workers who reject the
very low wages. Rates of unemployment have little to do with population size and
density. Rather, it is economic structures and cycles that influence the rate of
unemployment.241 Some of the world‘s most densely populated countries (Singapore for
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example) are also among the most wealthy. Population size and density have little to do
with the rates of unemployment.

Adding more people to a country through immigration may not always reduce
average national income, it may even enhance it. Receiving countries even benefit from
irregular migration because it is largely these migrants who form a flexible workforce,
providing extra labour when needed but easily discarded during lean periods. During
economic downturns, not all native populations have exhibited high levels of animosity
towards immigrants, and citizens of some countries have expressed animosity even
during periods of modest economic growth.242 This conflict does not emerge from real
competition in the labour market but from the perception of competition.

Though they can be treated as contextual factors, xenophobic tendencies are
responsive to broader changes in political, social, and economic structures. The strength
of xenophobia may vary with different social, economic, and political conditions,
suppressed at certain times and re-appearing in strength at others. Pain‘s analysis of
xenophobia in Russia reveals that the collapse of the old Soviet Union, the demise of
communism and a general disintegration of Soviet society have all played a part in the
emergence of an aggressive nationalism that opposes the entry of immigrants.243 In
Europe, the political and economic integration of countries into the European Union (EU)
has sharpened these differential tendencies. As the internal boundaries of the EU have
become more permeable, the external boundaries have been more tightly closed.244 Other
scholars have linked the events of 9/11 to the ‗securitization‘ of migration where
international migration is linked to terrorism and becomes a ‗security threat.‘245 A metapolitics of immigration emerges where it not only becomes a threat to ‗our‘ jobs, income,
housing or culture, but also a threat to the lives of citizens.
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Wieworka‘s analysis links the escalation of xenophobia, racism, and differential
nationalism to modernity and the structural transformation of industrial societies in what
he terms ‗destructuration.‘246 The decline in industries through the closing of factories as
well as the decay in the working class movement has created a social and economic
dualization in these societies. Unlike the past, where people had a strong sense of
belonging to a society, a growing proportion feel excluded and marginalized, creating
conditions for renewed expressions of xenophobia and racism. Those who are ‗out‘
experience a loss of social identity, blaming their misfortunes on migrants, even if the
latter share the same experience. Another aspect of destructuration is that state and public
institutions are increasingly unable to fulfill their welfare functions, which exacerbates
insecurity and the tendency to seek scapegoats. These changes also activate political
debates about nation, nationality and citizenship but the progressive dimensions of
nationalism are eroded. National identity is increasingly tied to racist and xenophobic
expressions.

The media has often been criticized for subtly and not-so-subtly fanning the
flames of xenophobic sentiment in many countries. Analyses of representative articles on
RASIM (Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Immigrants and Migrants) in British newspapers
between 1996 and 2006 showed that a small number of topics were used to portray them,
displaying a largely negative stance.247 These topics centered on exaggerated numbers,
depreciatory constructions of RASIM as an economic burden (as abusers of welfare),
threat to cultural and community values, danger, and legality issues.248 Refugees and
asylum-seekers were commonly portrayed using water metaphors like ‗flood,‘ ‗waves,‘
‗pour‘ and ‗stream‘ constructing them as an ‗out-of-control, agent-less, unwanted natural
disaster.‘249 The term ‗immigrant‘ constantly carried an uncomplimentary connotation
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discussed largely in the context of non-positive topics like ‗immigrants and illegality‘ and
‗immigrants as/and problems.‘250 Many newspapers used nonsensical terms to describe
RASIM like ‗illegal refugees/asylum-seekers‘ and ‗bogus im/migrants‘ establishing the
boundaries of those who merited inclusion while underscoring the negative aspects of
immigration.251 The most commonly-used stereotype of a RASIM member was ‗a
different-looking (generally non-Caucasian), healthy (but lazy) adult, a single male with
no or little educational or professional skills.‘252
The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)‘s study on UK media coverage of
asylum-related issues found that some 22 million residents or more than one-third of the
British population subscribed on a frequent basis to four large British newspapers that
consistently demonized asylum-seekers through false, inaccurate and distorted stories
about them.253 Like other research critical of media portrayals of immigration, this study
argues that negative press on a large and frequent scale has a direct and damaging
influence on public opinion. People believe what they read in newspapers because it
confirms their prejudices and legitimizes existing hostility.254 When harmful myths on
immigration and immigrants are not challenged, they are normalized and accepted as
facts. Another IPPR study showed that many British citizens believed false stories about
asylum-seekers including those printed in tabloid newspapers, like asylum-seekers
receiving free golf lessons, swimming lessons or bus passes.255 ‗It was in the local paper
that they [asylum-seekers] get free bus passes whereas old people have to pay‘ was how
one respondent described it.256
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Studies from diverse social, political, and geographical contexts display
disturbing similarities in negative imagery and rampant use of stereotypes in migrant
representation.257 A study of press coverage in Slovenia showed that words like
‗crowding,‘ ‗swamping,‘ ‗besieging,‘ and ‗flooding‘ were repetitively used in reference
to immigration.258 Migrants were dehumanized by referring routinely to ‗hunt‘ for
‗illegals.‘ Like other countries, articles perpetually accentuated the fear and sense of
threat posed by the migrants: ‗Crime in Siskia…has literally blossomed,‘ ‗all the
foreigners are becoming an excessive burden for our country,‘ ‗all the costs have to be
paid by us penniless citizens, who ourselves are already living on the edge of poverty‘
and ‗illegals can swamp little Slovenia.‘259 ‗What in the name of God, Allah, Buddha or
the animist deities can these foreigners do for us to accept them more willingly and
easily, nothing,‘ observed a journalist while another pointed out that ‗a lot of all this is
wrong because some people just have rights but others just have duties.‘260

In Australia, the media has been blamed by many commentators for the outbreak
of anti-immigrant violence in Sydney in 2005. On December 11th an estimated five to
seven thousand people (most under the age of twenty-five) took to the streets in the beach
suburb of Cronulla to demonstrate their frustration toward the appearance of people of
Middle Eastern descent, on ‗their‘ beach.261 In the days leading up to the riot, newspapers
and talk-radio hosts frequently repeatedly broadcast the racist text messages that had been
sent out to drum up support for the rally. The day before the attack The Daily Telegraph
published an article with the first line, ‗Cronulla is a suburb under siege.‘ Most media
failed to accurately report on the event that sparked the riot – an attack on three young
surf lifesavers the previous weekend by a group of Lebanese youth.
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The Australian media widely publicised the attack. They reported that the young
men of ‗Middle Eastern appearance‘ had been swimming outside the flags which are
posted by surf lifesavers to denote where it was safe to swim. When approached by three
surf lifesavers and asked to swim only within the flags, the group of ‗thugs‘ (which
ranges in number from four to twenty-five in articles in The Daily Telegraph alone)
instead responded with a violent attack. What the media failed to acknowledge however,
was that the surf lifesavers were out of uniform, and it therefore would have been
impossible to identify them as such. In addition, the group of young men were apparently
taunted with calls of ‗Lebs can‘t swim‘ before the attack took place.262 It was in fact not a
random, unprovoked, attack. The stories and discussions published by the media no doubt
encouraged many people to participate in the riot and are probably largely responsible for
the great numbers that eventually turned up in support of Cronulla ‗locals.‘

A Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) study of press coverage on
immigration in South Africa found that a large number of articles frequently used racial
and national stereotypes to describe migrants from other African countries such as
‗Mozambicans as car thieves‘ and ‗Nigerians as drug smugglers.‘263 Coverage was
largely negative with many news articles and features using anti-immigrant frames by
uncritically reproducing dubious statistics and flawed assumptions about immigration.
Twenty-five percent of the articles used sensational headlines that reinforced myths and
stereotypes about migrant groups, like ‗Illegals in SA add to decay of cities,‘ ‗6 million
migrants headed our way‘ and ‗Africa floods into Cape Town.‘264

A more recent SAMP study of media representation of immigration in Southern
African countries between 2001 and 2003 included South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia
and Botswana. It found that despite some improvement since the 1990s, coverage was
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largely negative and unanalytical.265 Pejorative images of migrants as ‗job-stealers,‘
‗criminals‘ and ‗illegals‘ were still being perpetuated in articles. However, the most
negative coverage was seen in Botswana and Namibia. In Botswana, 45 percent of
articles made at least one negative reference to migration, singling out Zimbabwean
migrants in particular for derision and ridicule. In Namibia, the press frequently described
migrants and refugees as ‗illegal‘ and openly associated criminal activity with Angolan
and Zimbabwean migrants.

HUMAN

DEVELOPMENT

OUTCOMES

FOR

MIGRANT

AND

HOST

POPULATIONS

Without exception, human development outcomes of xenophobia for migrant and
host populations are negative, pernicious, and damaging. The persistence or growth of
xenophobia in receiving societies seriously diminishes the benefits and positive returns
from international migration for migrant groups, receiving countries, and countries of
origin. Xenophobia undermines democratic structures and liberal values along with
principles of equality, fairness and social justice. It erodes universally accepted human
rights standards and creates a global milieu in which discrimination against, and illtreatment, of non-citizens becomes acceptable and tolerated. The contemporary
resurgence of xenophobia has challenged and even weakened the international human
rights framework. Xenophobia is tied to the decline in liberal values in Western
democracies and the growing popularity of new forms of exclusionary thinking.
Xenophobic attacks on migrant groups represent a threat to social order and justice which
encourages lawlessness.

As the victims and targets of xenophobia and discrimination, migrant groups are
the most adversely affected. In situations of heightened xenophobia, migrants have to
endure the perpetual threat of violence and victimization in their lives. Xenophobia thus
exacerbates the vulnerability of migrant groups, exposing them to regular harassment,
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intimidation, and abuse by citizens, employers, and enforcement agencies in receiving
states. The weak social position of migrant groups in host countries has been extensively
documented. A new study by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
shows that both documented and undocumented migrants in South Africa live in a state
of ‗permanent insecurity,‘ facing coercion and aggravation on a frequent basis by police
personnel.266 During the inspection of state-issued IDs, police officers commonly demand
bribes, money and goods from migrants. They also subject migrants to physical and
verbal abuse. Women migrants are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation.

While xenophobia has an adverse effect on all categories of migrants, some
migrants are much more prone to victimization than others. Above all, irregular migrants
are extremely susceptible, due largely to their lack of status in receiving states. In
Malaysia, for instance, apprehended irregular migrants have been subjected to detention,
caning and imprisonment.267 Immigration-enforcement agencies like RELA routinely
employ aggressive methods during raids to detect irregular migrants. In a similar manner,
when asylum-seekers and refugees are treated as ‗illegal‘ migrants, they can endure harsh
treatment at the hands of authorities. They can face long periods in detention centers and
experience poor conditions of confinement, including inadequate food, housing, and
medical facilities.268

Research has highlighted the frequent assault on the human dignity and selfrespect of migrants in receiving states. In Libya, African migrants from sub-Saharan
countries have faced brutality and verbal insults by locals, including children, while
conducting their daily lives.269 In situations where immigrant groups are demonized as
‗threats‘ and ‗problems,‘ they are even more socially excluded. The new ‗securitization‘
of migration has brought renewed negative attention to migrant groups, increasing their
powerlessness. It has created an unstable social situation and exacerbated the risks of
physical violence between natives and migrants. In India, for instance, Bangladeshi
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migrants are treated with suspicion by police and intelligence agencies because of the
popular belief that they harbour terrorists or are engaged in terrorist activities.270
Bangladeshi migrants have been rounded up and detained in police custody following
bomb blasts in cities like Jaipur and New Delhi.271

When migrants are made scapegoats for various problems, the result is to increase
the social distance between migrant and local populations. Contact between them is
reduced and these groups are prevented from interacting socially or developing friendly
relations that can correct biases and prejudices. In this respect, xenophobia has an
unfavourable impact on social cohesion. Besides, it contributes to shrinking tolerance and
respect for other cultures and fosters the distrust of diversity in societies.

Prolonged mistreatment of migrants in host countries can exacerbate social
inequalities between migrant and non-migrant populations. That is, xenophobia impedes
the social and economic integration of migrants in receiving societies. This trend is
already being witnessed in many receiving states where migrants face discrimination in
areas like employment, housing, health and education. In terms of employment, migrant
groups often take up undesirable, unskilled, jobs that pay low wages, involve long hours
and provide few benefits. They can be placed in jobs where there is little possibility of
upward mobility, that contribute to de-skilling, and are paid lower wages than native
workers. This situation can be even worse for marginal migrant groups, like irregular
migrants and asylum-seekers, who often endure conditions of super-exploitation at work.
In Indian cities, many Bangladeshi migrants perform ‗dirty‘ scavenging work like the
collection and recycling of garbage and waste material, a task traditionally performed by
the lowest, untouchable Indian caste groups.272

An International Labour Organization (ILO) study on Burmese child migrant
workers, carried out by the Federation of Trade Unions – Burma (FTUB) in Mae Sot,
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Thailand, shows that they were ‗working day and night, week after week, for wages that
were far below the legal minimum wage, to the point of absolute exhaustion.‘273 Nearly
half of the respondents were seventeen years old and some were as young as twelve years
of age. Many of them had been enrolled in schools in Myanmar. Another study on
Indonesian domestic workers in Malaysia has documented the slave-like conditions of
employment, with migrants generally working sixteen to eighteen hour days seven days a
week.274 Many domestic workers were socially isolated, forbidden to leave the house or
maintain contact with outsiders. Many employers also withheld their salaries which
meant that migrants often endured dire work conditions or worked illegally to earn
sufficient money to return to their home communities. Sometimes, employers even
confiscated the worker‘s passport, preventing them from leaving abusive situations.

Similarly, migrant groups often face discrimination in access to basic health-care.
In Malaysia, irregular migrants and asylum-seekers are reluctant to seek medical
treatment because hospitals are required to inform authorities. Even pregnant women who
have gone to hospital for delivery have not been exempted; they have been arrested with
their newborn soon after delivery.275 An MSF briefing paper on Malaysia reveals that
many irregular migrants are unable to afford medical care. Both irregular migrants and
refugees face linguistic and financial barriers to obtain health services. 276 The paper
further records the sub-standard living conditions of these groups in jungle locations to
evade apprehension and deportation. Others had set up small huts with no electricity or
toilets and were susceptible to infections. Bangladeshi migrants occupy make-shifts
shanties in the most undesirable marginal spaces of slums in Indian cities, located near
open sewers, railway lines or bridges.277
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Xenophobia legitimizes cruel and degrading treatment of migrants and refugees.
Continued discriminatory treatment of migrant groups can contribute, in the long-term, to
the emergence of a new social underclass. In many contexts, migrants already represent
some of the most marginalized, weak and exploited groups in host societies,
economically and socially disadvantaged by virtue of their foreign origin. They can exist
in a state of social isolation and alienation in receiving states. Above all, it creates a
situation in which increased social insecurity is experienced not only by migrant
populations but by other minority and marginalized groups as well. In this respect,
xenophobia adversely impacts and enhances other forms of discrimination. For example,
weak citizenship verification systems in India have led to the victimization of poor
Muslim and Bengali communities during state operations to detect and deport irregular
migrant Bangladeshis.278 Some of those identified as Bangladeshis, and subsequently
deported, were in reality legitimate citizens. Likewise, provinces like Assam and
Maharashtra that have displayed some of the strongest antipathy towards migrant
Bangladeshis have also witnessed brutal attacks in recent times on Indian migrants from
other provinces like Bihar, Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh.279

POLICY RESPONSES

What kinds of policy response have there been to counter xenophobia and how successful
are they? When countries in the North obstruct the rights of refugees to seek safe haven,
they set an extremely negative example for other states, especially those in the South that
host a majority of the world‘s refugees.280 Similarly in the case of migrant labour, many
developing countries are now opting to emulate developed host countries that have
adopted restrictive and discriminatory policies.

278

Ramachandran, Sujata 2005 ‗Indifference, impotence, intolerance‘; see also Citizens‘ Campaign for
Preserving Democracy (CCPD) 2005 Democracy, Citizens and Migrants: Nationalism in the Era of
Globalization, CCPD: New Delhi
279
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) 2007 ‗Assam: violence against Hindi-speaking
people
forced
thousands
to
flee
the
state‘,
January,
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/3103ECD3FE7D139D802570B8005A729E?
OpenDocument (Last accessed March 2009).
280
HRW 2000 ‗Refugees: Western Europe weakening protections‘, December 11

64

Bad Practices

Notwithstanding the sovereign right of states to include or exclude migrants, immigrants,
refugees and asylum-seekers from their territories, state policies on immigration can
directly and indirectly heighten xenophobia. Equally importantly, practices adopted by
state agencies like police, immigration officials, and other enforcement agencies can
perform a contributory role in inciting and perpetuating xenophobia.

From the late 1990s onwards, many destination countries adopted ever-narrower
policies and rescinded their acceptance and tolerance of the presence of migrants,
including irregular migrants. For example, Tanzania, which was long recognized as an
exemplary host to tens of thousands of refugees, began imposing a series of harsh
policies against refugees in 2003. From May 2006 to May 2007, the country expelled
nearly 15,000 Rwandans and several thousand Burundians, some of them registered
refugees, by closing down schools and ending employment programs for them. Amnesty
International has claimed that many refugees were harassed, beaten and had their
property confiscated during the expulsions.281

In early 2008, Tanzania forcibly repatriated more than 150 Burundian refugees for
violating the restrictive terms of the Refugees Act.282 These refugees had been
apprehended by a special police unit while they were collecting firewood outside the
camps in violation of terms laid out in the Refugees Act. The Act requires all asylumseekers and refugees to live in refugee camps or settlements designated by the Tanzanian
government. It further imposes severe limitations on their movement outside the camps.
Failure to comply with the rules can result in a jail sentence of up to six months and fines
of nearly 50,000 shillings ($45). In addition, the Act forbids refugees from working
without a permit though the procedure for obtaining the permits remains unclear. So far,
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no refugee has been granted the permit. Similar restraining measures have been put in
place for migrant labour in countries like Malaysia and Thailand.

Destination countries often refuse to accept asylum-seekers as refugees, treating
them as ‗illegal immigrants‘ or ‗illegal aliens.‘ The erosion of the international
framework for refugee protection has been noted with concern by refugee-advocacy
groups like the UNHCR. In 2006, Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees made these disturbing observations:

Abuse of the asylum system is a hot topic among industrialized nations, especially
in the European Union. But the abuse of asylum seekers is not. The EU, Council
of Europe, and the UN have between them assembled an impressive array of
bodies to deal with the wider issues of racism and xenophobia. But these
discussions have been drowned out by other political debates.283

Countries may also adopt severe policies that discriminate against migrants and
violate the basic and human rights of immigrants. In 1993, the newly appointed Côte
d‘Ivoire President Konan Bedie swiftly reversed the generous ‗open door‘ immigration
policy of his predecessor by introducing the constricted notion of ‗Akwaba‘ or
‗Ivoirite.‘284 Implemented primarily as a tactic to crush his main political opponent,
Alassane Outtara, this new policy decreed that only residents who were born of Ivorian
parents and were ethnically ‗pure‘ could claim citizenship.285 As a result, nearly onefourth of the country‘s population of 17 million, especially those in the northern and
western parts of the country, were disenfranchised, and labelled as ‗foreigners.‘
Especially affected were migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries like Guinea,
Burkina Faso, Mali and Liberia who had migrated to Côte d‘Ivoire in previous decades.
They had been previously allowed to own land and freely integrate into the Ivorian
283
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society. Also affected were descendants of migrants, some of them third or fourth
generation progeny who had lived all their lives in the country.

Even though Bedie was overthrown in a military coup in 2000, his successor
General Robert Guei continued along a similar xenophobic path by bringing in a
constitutional amendment that would exclusively permit ‗pure‘ Ivorians to contest the
elections. Xenophobic violence flared up yet again in Côte d‘Ivoire in September 2002
after military installations were attacked in Abidjan, Bouake and Korhogo.286 Perceived
as an attempted coup d‘ etat by foreign elements, widespread harassment and attacks on
those deemed ‗foreigners‘ were reported. It is believed that some 20,000 immigrant
households lost their homes to the violence in Abidjan.287

Governments in host countries can unjustly attribute various problems
encountered by citizens like crime and unemployment to migrants. In many countries,
migrants and refugees have been characterized by mainstream politicians and government
officials as ‗problems.‘ Of late, they have been portrayed as a threat to national security.
In his recent election campaign, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlesconi described
irregular migrants as the ‗army of evil.‘288 A senior Libyan government official informed
Human Rights Watch that if the country accepted refugees, ‗they would come like
locusts.‘289 Biased attitudes of government officials and inflammatory statements about
migrants often consolidate prevailing stereotypes about migrants and refugees. In his
address to the nation in May 2006, former President George W Bush linked irregular
migrants to several troubles faced by the United States: ‗Illegal immigration puts pressure
on public schools and hospitals. It strains state and local budgets, and brings crime to our
communities [emphasis in original].‘290
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State authorities can incite xenophobic sentiments by targeting specific groups of
immigrants or refugees. In September 2000, Guinean President Lansana Conte reversed
his country‘s longstanding support for refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia by
publicly accusing them of protecting rebels and militias, holding them responsible for
frequent cross-border attacks.291 In a radio and television address, he openly declared: ‗I
am giving orders that we bring together all foreigners in [Guinean] neighborhoods so that
we know what they are doing and that we search and arrest suspects. Civilians and
soldiers, let‘s defend our country together. Crush the invaders.‘292 Guinea hosted about
125,000 Liberian and 330,000 Sierra Leonean refugees at that time, many of whom had
fled civil war and gross human rights violations in their home countries.293 Afterwards,
thousands of refugees were violently attacked, beaten, raped, detained by police, ousted
from their homes, and had their property stolen in the capital Conakry.294 A refugee
informed Human Rights Watch: ‗In Guinea, I am afraid of three types of people: the
government, the citizens, the rebels. In Sierra Leone, there is just one: the rebels.‘295

Destination countries also crucially shape the treatment of migrants and
immigrants in other ways. They can perpetuate migrants‘ exploitation by disregarding the
ill-treatment of migrants and refugees at the hands of employers, police, government
officials and citizens. They can also continue the discrimination against migrants by
failing to put into place measures to safeguard migrant rights. When host states adopt
highly punitive measures to control irregular migration that include difficult conditions of
detention and imprisonment, they can easily create a sense of crisis or siege regarding
immigration and exacerbate existing hostility towards immigrants. In July 2008, for
example, the Italian senate agreed to impose tough new measures to curb irregular
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migration. These include extended jail sentences from four to six years and confiscation
of properties rented to irregular migrants.296 In mid-June 2008, the European Parliament
accepted a proposal to hold irregular migrants in detention centers for up to eighteen
months, and to ban expelled migrants from re-entering the European Union for up to five
years.297

Certainly there is a major role to be played by independent human rights
watchdogs in every country where migrants are ill-treated, but governments do not tend
to respond well to what is often very damaging information about their policies and
practices.

Malaysian authorities, for example, have reacted harshly to criticism of their
immigration practices. Following the publication of a report by Irene Fernandez in 1996
outlining the constant exploitation, sexual abuse, ill-treatment, and lack of adequate
medical care for detained irregular migrant workers, the Malaysian government arrested
and charged her with ‗maliciously publishing false news.‘298 The report, titled
‗Memorandum on abuses, acts of torture and inhuman treatment towards migrant workers
in detention camps‘ was conducted by Tenaganita, a migrant advocacy non-governmental
organization co-founded by Fernandez. The report was based on interviews with 300
irregular migrants in detention centers in 1994-95 for a research project on health and
HIV/AIDs among migrant workers. Many of those interviewed for the report were from
Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines.299 It urged the authorities to establish an
independent commission to examine the poor condition of migrants in detention centers
and alleged human rights abuses within.300
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Although the state authorities announced the setting up of an independent
Visitors‘ Panel to inspect the centres, Fernandez underwent the longest trial in the
country‘s history. During the trial, she testified 310 times. Former migrant workers who
had been detained in the centres during the study period gave testimonies that supported
the findings of the Tenaganita report. They revealed the regular beatings, cruel and
humiliating punishment they were subjected to by the police guards. They further
confirmed the inadequate conditions prevailing in the centres, including sub-standard
nutrition, medical and sanitary conditions. On 16 October 2003, Fernandez was found
guilty and sentenced to 12 months‘ imprisonment. Presiding magistrate Juliana Mohamed
declared that the abuses outlined in the report were fabricated and the testimonies
collected by Tenaganita had been acquired ‗without effort to obtain the truth in their
statements.‘ Moreover, the court observed that since the memorandum had discredited
the Malaysian nation, Irene Fernandez‘s case ‗must be made an example.‘ She was
finally acquitted on 25 November 2008 thirteen years after she was first charged.301

Good Practices

Xenophobia is a growing global problem in migrant-destination countries of the
North and, increasingly the South. Examples of ―good practice‖ policy responses and
effective, transferable solutions are not overly abundant. This suggests the need for a
fundamental re-evaluation both of the causes and persistence of xenophobia and how best
its pernicious effects might be mitigated.

What are some of the more common ―good

practice‖ responses to xenophobia? And why has their impact to date been so limited?
In answering these questions, it is clear that ad hoc, piecemeal and uncoordinated
responses to the growing problem of xenophobia are insufficient and have little lasting
effect. The flurry of civil society and government initiatives in South Africa in the wake
of the violence in May 2008 were ―crisis‖ responses to a deeper and more complex
problem. Many have since run out of steam and their impact is uncertain. As that
particular round of xenophobic violence recedes with the closure by government of all
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camps for the internally-displaced, so the urgency of concerted action has receded.
Meanwhile, the cancer of xenophobia continues to spread.

There is clearly a need for greater monitoring and research on citizen attitudes to
migrants, refugees and migration policy in states where xenophobia is a problem or is on
the rise. The information base on public attitudes is generally quite poor, particularly in
the South. Anecdotal evidence is insufficient and general questions in endeavours such as
the World Values Survey do not provide the kind of in-depth information that survey
research can provide on the nature and reasons for particular attitudes, as well as the
common stereotyping that accompanies intolerance. Such research would allow for
evidence-based interventions and permit the assessment of the effectiveness of counterxenophobia measures and policies.

While the causes and manifestations of xenophobia are clearly unique to each
country, the fact that xenophobia is spreading as international migration increases does
not mean that the solutions are similarly unique. There is clearly a need for a coordinated
global response to xenophobia and for international organizations to work in tandem with
national governments and regional bodies in addressing the problem. It would be naïve to
think that governments, on their own, will act unequivocally against xenophobia absent
of pressure from civil society organizations and the courts. The ideal scenario would see
a coordinated plan by international bodies, government, civil society, labour and business
being developed and implemented.
‗Good practice‘ models are in short supply but they do need to be identified and
evaluated and, where there are results or the promise of success, be widely disseminated.
This could apply not only to government policies but also to civil society initiatives, to
public education campaigns and to the media. The core elements of a coordinated ―good
practice‖ model would include:

Greater understanding of citizen attitudes to migrants, refugees and migration
policy through research which also uncovers the root causes of xenophobia and
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evaluates the effectiveness of interventions from the perspective of citizens and
migrants;
Ratification and implementation of normative global standards on the protection
of migrants such as the UN Migrant Workers Convention and relevant ILO
conventions;
Global, regional and national monitoring of the treatment of migrants in
destination countries;
National political leadership and will to acknowledge and condemn the presence
of xenophobia and to advocate tolerance and the benefits of migration;
Legislative solutions including the criminalization of xenophohia as hate speech
and appropriate sanctions against the perpetrators of xenophobic violence;
Identification and critical analysis of xenophobic discourse in the media and
media education for reporters and editors;
Public education campaigns by the state and civil society to foster tolerance, build
social cohesion and encourage diversity.

1. Measuring and Understanding Xenophobia

The prevalence and manifestations of xenophobia can be measured by
investigating the following:

Attitudes of the native population towards migrants, immigrants and refugees
through public opinion surveys, both qualitative and quantitative.
Attitudes of political parties, both mainstream and extreme right-wing, towards
immigration including critical analyses of legislative debates on immigration,
speeches, interviews, and comments on immigration (overall and on particular
groups of migrants) by politicians, and election manifestos of political parties.
Other materials that can be examined are pamphlets, magazines and literature on
immigration (especially on selected groups of immigrants such as refugees)
sponsored

by

political

parties.

Books

and

articles

produced

by

ideologues/supporters of extreme-right wing parties can also be studied.
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Media depiction of immigration – How accurately does the mainstream media
(print and other media) represent immigration-related issues? For example,
analysis of print media through content like articles, features, op-ed pieces, letters
to the editor, political cartoons and editorials can indicate the general level of
acceptance for immigration and migrant groups.
Internet sites for groups strongly opposed to immigration like Migration Watch in
the UK
Hate-sites set up by Neo-Nazi groups and state responses to such groups like
stringent anti-hate crime legislation
Migrant/immigrant/refugees‘ lived experiences in host countries. What kind of
social insecurity, intolerance and discrimination do they experience in their daily
lives and how common is it?
Episodes of violent attacks on migrants and refugees can be assessed through
media coverage of events, eye-witness narratives, and accounts produced by
national/ international civil society groups and/or migrant advocacy groups.
Inventory or database of hate-crimes involving migrants and refugees as victims
States‘ policies on social cohesion, protection of the rights of migrants, and
equally importantly, practices of immigration control. To what extent have states
adopted and complied with international human rights instruments like the
Refugee Convention?
Tolerance towards ethnic minorities in host countries. Generally, areas with lowlevels of tolerance towards minorities exhibit higher levels of xenophobia

A systematic, coordinated program of applied research on xenophobia (such as
that pioneered in countries such as South Africa and India) in the global South is
imperative. This should have outcomes such as evidence-based public education and
media strategies.
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2. Normative Standards

Responding to the unanimous appeal by participants at the World Conference on
Human Rights, held at Vienna in 1993 to strengthen the international human rights
mandate, the United Nations created the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner of Human Rights (OCHCR) the same year.302 It is the leading
international body for the protection of human rights of all communities and groups. The
Office closely monitors the human rights situation in countries and works closely with
national bodies, governments, NGOs and the UN human rights monitoring system to
build capacity, especially at the national level, to protect these rights.303 As far as
international migration is concerned, the OCHCR views the protection of the human
rights of migrant groups as central to migration management and policy. 304 It has set up
an in-house Migration Task Force to review and work on migration-related topics.305 The
Migration Task Force contributes to the activities of the UN Commission on Human
Rights. The OHCHR drafts the annual report on the rights of migrants on behalf of the
UN Secretary-General. It is a member of The Geneva Migration Group and has provided
feedback to the Global Commission on International Migration and the Expert Group
Meeting on International Migration and Development. It is also a member of the Steering
Committee for the Ratification of the International Convention on the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and members of Their Families (ICMW).

The adoption of the ICMW by the UN General Assembly in 1990 delivered a new
set of international norms for the protection of migrants and their family members. In
contrast to other rights-based UN Conventions (such as the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and the UN Convention on the Rights of the
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Child), the ICMW has experienced a long and painful gestation. At the latest count
(March 2009), the Convention had 41 ratifications and 15 signatories.306 None of these
countries are in the North and few are major migrant-receiving countries.307 The reasons
for the global reluctance of states to ratify have been exhaustively examined by UNESCO
but at root there is little enthusiasm for the fundamental idea that migrants should enjoy
the same rights and legal and social protection as citizens and permanent residents.308
None of the case study countries considered in this paper have ratified the Convention
and some are actively opposed to it.

Malaysia, for example, is far from unique in Asia in its opposition to the
Convention. However, it does have the poorest ratification record of UN instruments.
There is little public debate about the rights of migrant workers, who keep a low profile
‗apart from the odd riot by Indonesian workers.‘309 The Employment Act is deemed to
offer sufficient protection but is not widely implemented. All migrant workers have been
prohibited from marrying Malaysians and the government reportedly feels that if the
Convention were ratified, the country would be ‗flooded‘ with migrants who could not be
repatriated.

Extending protections to irregular migrants is generally viewed as

unacceptable by the state and citizenry, as it is in South Africa.
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South Africa has no official position on the UN Convention. Indeed, at the top of
the list of reasons for non-ratification is the lack of awareness and knowledge of the
Convention itself. Perhaps this is a debate that the state does not want to encourage,
preferring to wait on the response of other migrant destination states, but many of the
provisions of the Convention are not substantively different from what is already
contained in South Africa‘s domestic policies and laws.310 However, for as long as
migration policy continues to be a low priority issue for both government and civil
society, the likelihood that South Africa will take the first steps towards ratifying the
Convention is low. On the other hand, the events of May 2008 might have prompted a
broader debate about migrant rights, in general, and the UN Convention in particular.
However, the opportunity was lost with the official denial that the violence had anything
to do with xenophobia.

The global campaign for the ratification of the Convention is gathering
momentum but migrant receiving states are likely to continue to be hold-outs which
significantly reduces the short-term prospect of the Convention‘s normative framework
becoming implemented in those states of the North and South where migrants need its
protections most.

In contrast to the GCIM and UNDP Secretary General‘s Report, the

African Union has taken a position in support of the Convention, calling on all states to
ratify in its Strategic Framework on Migration and in the African Common Position on
Migration and Development.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

has not endorsed the Convention or initiated a debate on ratification amongst its member
states. However, in response to the events in South Africa in 2008, SADC and the
African Population Commission issued an important joint statement on xenophobia.311

The SADC/ACP Statement on Xenophobia cites the African (Banjul) Charter
on Human Rights and People‘s Rights, 1986; the Plan of Action of the 1994 International
Conference on Migration and Development and the Programme of Action of the 2001
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
310
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Intolerance, but includes no reference to the UN Migrant Workers Convention. The
Statement acknowledges, however, that ‗xenophobia can undermine sustainable political,
social, economic development and regional integration.‘ It also notes that xenophobia
causes ‗displacement of people, including women, children and the disabled, with dire
social, health, economic and related consequences.‘ The states commit themselves to
fight xenophobia through various national and regional policies and programmes and
provides a 13-point plan of action including combating manifestations of rejection of
migrants and discouraging all actions generating xenophobia; promoting peaceful coexistence and tolerance of migrants; promoting respect for and protection of migrant
rights through civic education; encouraging legal and orderly migration; establishing fair
and effective procedures for refugee status determination; safeguarding the human
security needs of refugees; engaging in public information and awareness campaigns on
the plight and rights of refugees; disseminating information about migrants to promote
respect and understanding of migrants; combating human trafficking and working closely
with the UN, the private sector and civil society to address xenophobia and its
consequences.

Issued in the heat of xenophobic violence, the SADC/ACP is a

remarkably sober and pragmatic response to what it identifies as the ‗scourge of
xenophobia.‘

There is little evidence, almost a year on, that any of the member states

have actually acted on the many practical policy measures contained in the Statement.

3. Global Monitoring

The general disinterest in migrant rights in the 1980s and 1990s (exemplified by
the lukewarm response to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers) encouraged the UN
to adopt measures to monitor the position of migrants in destination countries. In 1999,
the OCHCR created the position of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants. The Rapporteur works to eliminate the violations of human rights of migrants,
immigrants, and refugees, including irregular or undocumented migrants.312 The mandate
of the Rapporteur extends to all countries, even those that have not ratified the
312
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International Convention on the Protection of Rights of all Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families. S/he invites and acts on information provided by various
sources on the abuse and discrimination against migrants, sends appeals and messages to
concerned governments informing them of the situation and/or inviting a response from
them, conducts fact-finding missions to various countries to assess the status of migrants
and refugees on the invitation of the Government, presents an annual report to the UN
Human Rights Council on the global state of protection of migrants, and provides
suggestions to promote migrant rights.313 Over the past four years, the current
commissioner Jorge Bustamante has undertaken visits to Indonesia, South Korea,
Burkina Faso, Peru, Italy and Iran.314 On 5 June 2008, the mandate of the Rapporteur was
extended for another three years.

More than a decade earlier, the OCHCR created the position of the Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance.315 The Rapporteur examines all forms of discrimination
globally and works closely with UN bodies to strengthen mechanisms to combat it. Like
the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, the Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance conducts country visits to assess the situation and requests individual
governments to respond to complaints. On March 28, 2008, the mandate of the
Rapporteur was extended to 2011. In the next two years or so, the Rapporteur will focus
their attention on issues such as episodes of discrimination against migrants, refugees and
asylum-seekers and other minorities, best practices in the elimination of discrimination
and right-wing political formations that incite hatred, racism, and xenophobia.
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In Europe, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI)
is a pan-European human rights‘ monitoring body set up in 1993 that examines issues
relating to intolerance including racism and xenophobia. In 1997, The European Union
created the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) as an
independent body to examine the phenomena and manifestations of racism, xenophobia
and related forms of intolerance like anti-Semitism. The principal objectives of EUMC
were to analyze the causes, consequences and effects of these phenomena, develop
strategies to counter these processes and document examples of good practices on
migrant integration in EU member states. On 15 February 2007, EUMC was re-named as
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).316 In order to collect
information and document the process nationally, the EUMC/FRA created the European
Information Network on Racism and Xenophobia (RAXEN) in 2000. The Network
consists of twenty-five Nodal Focal Points or NFPs, one in each member state. The
NFPs work with a variety of agencies to collect information, including data, reports and
analysis, for FRA. Some of the main activities of RAXEN include the production of
country reports, special analysis and the provision of critical information to European
institutions and FRA. Each year, the NFPs produce a country report documenting racism
and discrimination in five thematic areas, namely, employment, housing, education,
legislation, and racist crime and violence.
On December 7, 2004, the African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights
passed the resolution to establish a Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers,
Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.317 Among the main
responsibilities of the Commissioner are to carry out studies and activities to enhance the
protection of refugees and migrants on the continent. The Special Rapporteur also assists
Member States of the African Union to establish policies and mechanisms to better
protect refugees and migrant communities. S/he reports on the state of refugees and
316
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migrants in Africa at the sessions of the African Commission. The mandate of the Special
Commissioner was renewed for two years on November 23, 2007.
The NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa‘s Development) peer review
mechanism has also provided the opportunity for some states, including South Africa, to
be singled out for their poor treatment of migrants and refugees. The South African Peer
Review Report noted that ‗foreigners, mostly of African descent, are being subjected to
brutality and detention.‘318 Xenophobia was increasing and should be ‗nipped in the bud.‘
In its response, South Africa countered that ‗the assertion that illegal immigrants are
subject to brutal and inhuman treatment is strongly disputed.‘319 In South Africa, the
reports and investigations of international and local human rights organizations including,
notably, the state-funded South African Human Rights Commission, reached very
different conclusions.320

4. Political Leadership

Governments worldwide are not noted for their willingness to embrace the idea
that citizens are intolerant of foreigners or xenophobic. President Mbeki‘s denial that
South Africa‘s month of violence against foreign nationals had anything to do with
xenophobia is simply one example. More often, political leadership is completely mute
or anxious to deflect blame on to migrants themselves. There are few countries in the
world where a majority of the population favours immigration or is favourably disposed
to ‗strangers in our midst.‘ What marks out those who have begun to address the
problem is a willingness on the part of political leaders to condemn intolerance and
xenophobic action, to highlight the benefits of migration, to defend migrant rights and to
introduce social and cultural policies that foster social cohesion and celebrate diversity.
318
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Regrettably, these examples are few and far between. In many more cases, there are
political parties that make political hay out of the presence of foreign migrants and the
‗threat‘ they pose to citizens. In countries such as those considered in this paper, there is
a further problem that demands more than a rhetorical political response to xenophobia.
Very often it is the actions and words of politicians and officials that deliberately or
inadvertently promote an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility. States have employees
and when those employees are themselves xenophobic, the opportunities for abuse and
exploitation multiply.

5. Xenophobia and the Law

The Aliens Control Act of 1991 in South Africa set the direction and tone of postapartheid migration policy right up until the passage of the 2002 Immigration Act. To the
extent that the new Act duplicated the provisions of the old, it failed to provide a clean
break with that past. Throughout the 1990s, the Department of Home Affairs was
constantly in court facing challenges to its application of the law (and usually losing).
That losing trend has continued since 2002. In recent months, the Grahamstown High
Court overturned the decision of the Department of Home Affairs to deny a work permit
to a Zimbabwean teacher as an ‗illustrious example of litigation (that) was instituted for
the purpose of simply abusing the due process of law.‘ The Minister was ordered to pay
compensation for the loss of salary and the cost of 11 two-hour taxi rides to government
offices.321 In January 2009, eleven victims of xenophobic violence filed a claim for R5.7
million in damages and an ‗unconditional apology‘ from the authorities for
discrimination during the attacks and subsequent investigation of May 2008.322 The
vigorous independence of the South African judiciary means that the case will receive a
full and proper hearing.

In many countries where xenophobia is rampant, complaints against the authorities would
receive short shrift. Migrants see the legal system as complicit in their exploitation and
321
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abuse and would certainly not think of going to the courts for relief. Yet, the power of
legal challenges to xenophobia should not be underestimated. In a rare example of ‗good
practice,‘ the Parliament in Côte d‘Ivoire adopted a new Anti-Xenophobia Law in
August 2008 to counter conduct and activities that incite xenophobic violence and
tribalism.323 The law‘s preamble openly recognizes that such actions are divisive and
damaging to social harmony as they ‗weaken national unity and cohesion.‘ It imposes
stringent punishment on perpetrators including incarceration (five to ten years‘ sentence)
and fines (from $1200 to $12,000). Stiffer penalties are to be imposed on those found
guilty of inciting such acts by way of the media (radio, television, or print media),
Internet and during the course of a public demonstration or political rally.

6. Media Analysis and Education

The media is often complicit in building an atmosphere of mistrust and
misinformation in countries of destination where xenophobia is a problem but they are
also the first to hide behind the pretence of objectivity and facts-based reporting. SAMP
was publically denounced in 2008 by the South African Press Association (SAPA) for its
claim that SAPA was guilty of uncritically reproducing negative stereotypes of migrants.
SAPA threatened legal action with a counter-claim that all its reporting was ―facts-based‖
and ―neutral.‖ To prove its case, SAMP undertook a more systematic analysis of the
SAPA news archive and demonstrated that the problem of biased and inflammatory
reporting at the press association was even more serious than originally thought.
As this paper has demonstrated, ―bad practice‖ and sensationalist media reporting
and stereotyping of migrants is a pervasive problem in the global North and South. In
countries where racist language would be considered abhorrent and even illegal,
xenophobic stereotyping and imagery (often with racial undertones) seem perfectly
acceptable.

Media analysis is a critical first step but needs to be followed up with

systematic and coordinated education for journalists and editors.
323

Zamble, Fulgence 2008 ‗Anti-Xenophobia Law gets lukewarm reception‘, Inter-Press Service Agency,
http://ipsnews.net/africa/nota.asp?idnews=43629 (Last accessed December 2008). Many human rights
groups have criticized the law as too sweeping and draconian, however.

82

In the global South, radio and TV, not the print media, remain the main source of
information for many. In Southern Africa, SAMP targeted community radio chat shows
for its public education series on migration issues. The response from the public was
good but there was no funding for ongoing programming so the long-term impact was
probably small. National, state-funded broadcasters were less willing to air the series
although state radio in South Africa did carry a great deal of condemnatory commentary
on the xenophobic violence of May 2008.

6. Public Education

Public education, in the media, in communities, in schools and in workplaces, is a
critical antidote to the poison of xenophobia. In South Africa, such initiatives have been
initiated by civil society and international organizations, often in partnership. In the late
1990s, a multi-partner initiative to highlight the problem of xenophobia included the
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), National Consortium of Refugee
Affairs (NCRA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
several civil society groups including the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP).
As a result, the Rollback Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign was launched in South Africa
in December 1998.324 Through its programs, it aimed to counter increasing levels of antimigrant hostility in the country directed at African migrants and asylum-seekers. The
RBX campaign was the outcome of a series of consultative conferences attended by the
SAHRC and other migrant or rights advocacy groups including that on 15 October 1998
when the Braamfontein Statement on Xenophobia was drafted. The Statement
unequivocally stated: ‗South Africa needs to send a strong message that an irrational
prejudice

and

circumstances‘.

hostility
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non-nationals

is

not

acceptable
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any
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A plan of action was adopted by the RBX which would identify six priority areas:
condition and rights of refugees; violence against migrant hawkers; migrant human
rights‘ violations; role of education; the attitude and actions of government staff towards
migrants, especially Home Affairs and police officers; and finally, the representation of
migrant issues in the South African media.326 Special training programs were devised for
South African Police Services personnel, including border and community police,
educating them on the rights of migrants and refugees.327 Similarly, several media
sensitization workshops and seminars were held to encourage more balanced coverage of
immigration in the press as well as to enhance journalists‘ understanding of
displacement-inducing conflicts in the region.328 Literature such as pamphlets, posters
and a magazine, special radio programs like the ‗Once We were There‘ series
documenting the experiences of 10 South African exiles, and a national photography
project ‗Soutra: Images of Refuge‘ (Soutra refers to peace and protection in Madeng, a
dialect spoken in West Africa) involving refugees were other highlights of the
campaign.329

The RBX campaign ran out of funding in 2002 and the promise of the initiative
was never realised.

It was not until the horrific, large-scale attacks on migrants and

refugees six years later that civil society mobilized.

A coalition of over 20 South

African NGOs formed the Western Cape Emergency Civil Society Task Team and
activated the No to Xenophobia emergency mobile phone SMS network. Based on the
idea that ‗South Africa belongs to all those who live in it,‘ residents and citizens were
asked to condemn the violence by sending text messages, report incidents of violence to
the network (who would inform authorities), and to help victims and those displaced by
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the assaults through donations of food and blankets.330 At the same time, a collective of
South African independent and other film-makers launched the group Filmmakers
against Racism (FAR).331 To date, FAR has produced a series of short documentaries
and public service announcements (PSAs) documenting the violence and experiences of
those affected by it. The documentaries and PSAs produced by FAR have been broadcast
by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).

Likewise, the Sonke Gender Justice Network, a South African NGO, organized a
One Man Can Street Soccer Festival against Xenophobia in Khayelitsha outside Cape
Town in July 2008.332 The underlying message of the event was that ‗one person can halt
xenophobia, stop violence, support reintegration, celebrate diversity, demand justice and
make a difference‘.333 Fourteen teams consisting of equal numbers of citizens and
immigrants participated in this festival that attempted to enhance social contact and
rapport between migrant and non-migrant communities.334

In September 2008, the African Diaspora Forum (ADF) helped to launch an
Adopt a Country Initiative in schools in Alexandra, an informal township near
Johannesburg believed to be the starting point for the May 2008 anti-immigrant riots.335
Schools in this area have adopted each of the 54 African countries and school-children
are being taught their history, topography, customs, culture and food in an attempt to
promote tolerance and appreciation towards other communities.
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The effectiveness of these civil society interventions has yet to be assessed but the
problem of xenophobic attitudes is so deeply entrenched that piecemeal and under-funded
initiatives are unlikely to make much of a dent. The state should also take a lead in
recognizing and rooting out xenophobia in its own ranks. The likelihood of that
happening is diminishing further as the shock of May 2008 recedes. President Mbeki‘s
disavowal that the violence was xenophobic in character meant that what little
momentum there was in government to understand and address the causes of xenophobia
seemed to be lost.

Elsewhere, the Council of Europe for Diversity, Human Rights and Participation
(CoE) in partnership with the European Commission and the European Youth Forum,
created the All Different, All Equal Campaign which was carried out in 2006-07 in 42
member states.336 Following on from an older program conducted during the mid-1990s
and using the same slogan and theme, the campaign sought to promote respect for
diversity and promote greater understanding about human rights and discrimination based
on the general idea that all human beings are equal despite differences in appearance and
cultural beliefs.

Speak out against Discrimination is a new program instituted by the CoE in
2008 that seeks to bolster the role of the media in fighting all forms of prejudice and
discrimination, including Islamophobia and intolerance towards Roma.337 A training-kit
and virtual resource centre for journalists, book on anti-discrimination policies and CoE
guidelines, television and radio spots for free broadcasting, and other material on cultural
diversity, tolerance and the role of the media are to be prepared. 338 It is anticipated that
the program will result in the formation of a Collective of Friends, a group of media
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organizations and journalists who will actively promote inter-cultural dialogue in
Europe.339

Another CoE program, Dosta! Go beyond Prejudice, Discover the Roma
Campaign (taken from the Romani word meaning ‗Enough‘) promotes the social
inclusion of Roma peoples in Europe.340 In 2007, the Congress of Regional and Local
Authorities of the Council of Europe instituted a new Dosta! Congress Prize for
Municipalities in South Eastern European countries that actively advance the protection
and inclusion of Roma peoples.341 Other activities of the campaign include: a CD of
Roma music titled ‗Music beyond prejudice: Romani variations on the European
Anthem‘; a ‗School and Civil Society Awards‘ for NGOs and educational institutions in
the Western Balkans; a Public Service Announcement/TV spot on the Roma peoples; a
media training program on Roma culture and traditions in Serbia; ‗Art Against
Stereotypes‘ Festival in Tirana, Albania on 5-7 April, 2007 to celebrate International
Roma Day; a conference on ‗Romaphobia and Anti-Gypsyism‘ organized in
collaboration with the Forum of European Roma Young People (FERYP), and the ‗Roma
are Europe‘ Summer Camp and Roma Youth Festival in Ohrid, Macedonia.342

In Ukraine, a new program, Diversity Initiative (DIN), was set up in April 2007
by the UNHCR, Amnesty International, IOM and other NGOs after numerous episodes of
xenophobic attacks on African migrants.343 Conceived as a network of organizations that
get together on a regular basis for strategy meetings organized by the IOM and UNHCR,
DIN has contributed to the creation of an inter-agency anti-xenophobia working group
chaired by the State Committee of Nationalities and Religions as well as a public service
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announcement on tolerance screened on MTV, and to be broadcast regionally. DIN has
provided input into a new government White Paper on Ukrainian and European antidiscrimination legislation. The initiative maintains a database of xenophobic episodes
based on information provided by members and other bodies.344 So far, more than forty
organizations, including business, civil groups, international, and government bodies
have joined the campaign.
Conclusion
Xenophobia is a generalized problem that accompanies large-scale migration, in
both its legal and irregular manifestations. Its impact is pernicious and overt, poisoning
social interactions between locals and foreigners, licensing abuse and exploitation of
migrants, and undermining the positive development outcomes of migration. The key
paradox appears to be that good policies and practices often do not seem to enable
positive opinions and mitigate xenophobia. In many cases, this is explicable because of
the unwillingness of countries to admit that they even have a problem. Cash-strapped
NGO‘s and civil society organizations attempt to fill the breach with piecemeal programs
that have some local impact but often put them on a direct collision course with the
authorities.

In other countries, the effectiveness of anti-xenophobia measures is

compromised by the crisis-driven nature of the response. Once the crisis is over, as in
South Africa, enthusiasm for addressing the causes begins to wane. In situations where
xenophobic attitudes are deeply entrenched and pervasive, there is no quick fix. A
sustained and coordinated response over a considerable time period may be necessary. If
the South African Human Rights Commission‘s Roll Back Xenophobia campaign had not
shut its doors in 2002, it is just possible that the outrage of May 2008 would have been
avoided. The various elements of such a response are discussed in the previous section
of the paper. The crucial elements of that response include a coordinated comparative
applied research program to measure xenophobia and evaluate the effectiveness of
interventions; subscription to global and regional normative standards; monitoring of
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xenophobic actions at the national, national and sub-national levels; political leadership
and will; media education; and public education campaigns. All of these initiatives have
been tried in piecemeal and ad hoc fashion.

What is required, if the development

potential and gains of migration for destination and source countries are not to be
undermined by xenophobia, is a more coordinated and systematic effort to understand
and act. Governments on their own, even if they had the will, are unlikely to solve this
growing threat.
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